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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Transportation: An Instrument for Spatial Interaction
Transportation is one of the tools required
by civilized man to bring order out of chaos.
It reaches into every phase and facet of our
existence. Viewed from every standpoint, economic,
political, and military, it is unquestionably the
most important industry in the world. You can no
more operate a grocery store or a brewery than you
can win a war without transportation. The more
complex life becomes, the more indispensable are .
the things that make up our transportation systems.
Transportation, the movement of commodities, services,
ideas, or individuals across space, is a geographically-
necessitated activity, the development of which was originally
derived from the demand by primitive groups for commodities of
nature which could not be provided them all in one place.
Even though the complexities of spatial movement have now
evolved far beyond the simple supply-demand or complementary
region situation, geographical necessity, though intermingled
with other forces, is still a basis for spatial interaction.
As will be illustrated later in this paper, the degree and
type of spatial interaction which may occur between areas
Report of the Subcommittee on the Armed Services of the
House of Representatives, quoted in National Transportation
Policy, report prepared for the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, by the Special Study
Group on Transportation Policy in the United States. (Pursuant
to Senate Resolution 29, 151, 244 of 86th Congress, January,
1961.)
2horizontally removed from one another will depend on much
more than mere supply and demand. Such factors as the magni-
tude of demand, intervening opportunities for supply, and
effective distance or ease of movement in virtue of the type
of commodity being moved and the facilities available for its
movement must also be taken into account.
The vehicle or conveyance which is employed for the
purpose of moving goods or people across space from one place
to another is termed a "transportation facility.'" The study
set forth in this paper is to consider the spatial role of
one particular type of transportation facility, the pipeline,
in a particular situation, a wartime situation.
The Development of Pipeline Transport
.
The pipeline
can be considered to be a rather recent innovation into the
realm of vehicles that are used for spatial movement of commo-
dities if one considers only the very rapid development of
this conveyance for "long-distance" transportation within the
middle decades of the twentieth century, for it was in this
period that the major portion of the present world pipeline
pattern developed, and for that matter is still developing
today. However, if the situation is viewed more closely, it
can be seen that the pipeline is one of the oldest inanimate
transportation facilities in existence.
The early uses of the pipeline were generally for
peaceful purposes rather than for purposes of war. The most
common commodity carried, water, was employed in irrigation
projects, for bathing, or for household use. "The Chinese
are known to have made intensive use of pipelines constructed
of connected bamboo trunks, 5,000 years before Christ."
The Babylonians and Assyrians also made use of various types
of pipelines, as did the Romans, for the purpose of trans-
porting water into the famous Roman Baths. "There are traces
of clay tubes used for drainage purposes in sections of the
medieval world when man's reasoning was employed to supple-
ment natural surroundings." 3 Many of the kings of Europe,
such as Louis XIV, had pipeline systems installed to provide
their palaces with adequate water supplies.
It is interesting to note that most of these early
pipelines were "short distance" lines that operated on the
principle of gravity and served only a very limited area.
The "long distance" pressurized type pipeline, which is the
most common type in use today, did not come into existence
until the advent of the petroleum industry in the United States
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
^"Pipelines and Pipeline Transportation," Transportation
and Communications Review
, V Number 4, 1952, p. 23.
3M. E. Conkling, "Pipelines in Industry," Petroleum
Engineer , XV (March 19, 1944), p. 20.
The first oil well was drilled by Colonel Drake on
Oil Creek near Titusville, Pennsylvania, in August, 1859.
In the beginning there were two ways of moving oil out of
the area--by boat and/or by wagon. "The fact that Oil Creek
emptied into the Allegheny River made water transportation
to Pittsburgh a natural avenue for the oil trade." Many
of the other wells in this early period, like the first one
at Titusville, were drilled near streams and the oil was
loaded into barrels, tubs, or onto barges and shipped down-
stream to the market area. But as the oil industry began
to expand and new wells were drilled far removed from the
streams and rivers, other means of transport had to be pro-
vided for the movement of oil. At first, horse-and-wagon
teams were employed to move the oil from the wells sometimes
20 to 25 miles over very bad roads to streams or to newly
constructed railway lines that soon appeared in the area
after the big oil boom. This mode of transport, the horse-
and-wagon, and even the movement of oil by waterway and
railway, was extremely costly, unreliable and necessitated
such complicated handling practices that "probably up to
5
"50% of the cargo often could be booked as a loss."
Arthur M . Johnson, The Development of American
Petroleum Pipelines (1862-1^06). (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1956), p. 2.
P. 24.
"Pipelines and Pipeline Transportation," op. cit
.
,
A more efficient and economical means of transport
was needed, and this efficiency and economy was found in the
pipeline, which provided an economical even flow system with
a minimum of loss. From the construction of the first success,
ful "long distance" pipeline, which was "2 inches in diameter
and 5 miles long, built in 1865 from Pithole to Miller's farm
in Pennsylvania," the American system expanded so that by
the time of our entrance into World War One there had been
developed "a pipeline system comprising 19,441 miles of crude
oil trunk lines and 23,528 miles of gathering line, a total
of 42,969 miles." 7 By 1920 total mileage had risen to 52,993
miles, by 1930 to 110,654, and by 1941 to 131,913, including
Q
crude oil lines, gathering lines, and products lines.
In the period between the two world wars, the greatest
expansion of pipeline mileage occurred in the southwestern
and midwestern states of the United States, with an actual
decrease in mileage taking place along the Atlantic seaboard.
This decrease in mileage along the East Coast was not due to
a decrease in total petroleum consumption in the area, but
rather to a cost differential which existed between various
B. Dow Fayette, "The Role of Petroleum Pipelines in
the War," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science
,
CCXXX (November, 1943), p. 94.
7 Ibid.
8
Data is given here exclusively for the United States,
since "long distance" line systems were largely absent from
other world areas prior to World War Two, and an estimation
of world pipeline mileage in this period has proved unobtain-
able
.
6types of oil shipping facilities. "It was
. . .
more
economical to move oil by pipeline to the Gulf Coast and
thence by tank ship to the refineries on the Eastern sea-
gboard than through the older lines to the East Coast."
With the advent of the war in Europe in 1939, and
with an increase in German submarine activity in the Western
Atlantic, the effective distance for tankers to carry highly
inflammable cargo even in the coastal waters was increased.
For that reason internal transport facilities such as the
pipeline, the railroad tank car, and the river barge became
the principal carriers of petroleum and petroleum products
from the fields of production to the refinery and distribu-
tion centers. For the first time the "long distance" pipeline
was used as a major transport facility during a period of
1full-scale war. The use of the pipeline as a strategic
carrier of war commodities was not to be limited merely to
internal transport within the United States, but was also
to become a major implement of military logistic strategy in
many overseas areas and actually in some front lines operations
in both the European and Asiatic theatres of war.
gFayette, loc. cit.
1 Long distance petroleum pipelines were used on a
limited scale to ship petroleum to the East Coast during
World War One.
The Purpose of the Study
Since it appears that the pipeline did play a signifi-
cant part in the war effort, and since no general study has
been made of the pipeline to discover its role as a transport
facility, the author feels that such a study will be useful
to lead to a discovery of the pipeline's position as a facility
for the implementation of commodity flow between areas horizon-
tally removed from one another. The purpose of this study,
then, is to collect, organize, and analyze various types of
statistical data, maps, and other information, and in so doing
develop a concept as to the role played by the pipeline as an
integral part of the total transportation system of the allied
powers.
Preview of the Content
The following organization will be employed in making
such a study: Chapter Two, Transportation and War--Some
General Considerations , will briefly explore the role of
transportation in war and examine some of the problems encountered
in organizing an optimum wartime transportation system. In
Chapters Three and Four, The North American Pipelines and
Military Pipelines--£urope and Elsewhere , a descriptive study
of some of the more important facilities that were utilized in
the war will be presented. Finally, Chapter Five, The Pipeline--
An Integral Part of the Total Transportation Scheme , will be
8devoted to analyzing the overall importance of the role that
the pipeline actually played in the war in light of its
character and utilization.
CHAPTER II
TRANSPORTATION AND WAR--SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
In a tale of war, the reader's mind is filled
with fighting. The battle--with its vivid scenes,
its moving incidents, its plain and tremendous
results—excites imagination and commands attention.
The eye is fixed on the fighting brigades as they
move amid the smoke; on the swarming figures of the
enemy; on the General, serene and determined mounted
in the middle of his staff. The long trailing line
of communication is unnoticed. The fierce glory
that plays on red, triumphant bayonets dazzle the
observer; nor does he care to look behind to where,
along a thousand miles of rail, road, and river,
the convoys are crawling to the front in uninter-
rupted succession. Victory is the beautiful, bright
colored flower. Transport is the stem without which
it could never have blossomed.
This passage, written by Winston Churchill in The River
War
,
stresses the profound connection which exists between the
existence of an adequate transport net and defense capability.
Because such a close relationship does exist, the author thinks
it necessary to begin his study by devoting a chapter to the
presentation of a general overview of several factors which
may be helpful to the understanding of the role of transporta-
tion in war; and by gaining a better understanding of the
greater role played by the composite transportation system, it
is hoped that a better understanding may also be gained when
the study is narrowed to the more specific topic of the role
^Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense ,
as quoted from The River War (Harrisburg, Pa. ; Stackpole , Co
,
1959), p. 1.
10
of pipelines in war. The two sets of factors chosen for
discussion herein, and it is hoped that these factors repre-
sent in their brevity a true essence, are the following: A
study of the growing importance of transportation as an
integral part of the total wartime effort and an examination
of the various problems faced by the total transport system,
such as dislocation in demand, redistribution of commodity
flow, and problems of organization for the direction and
control of transportation.
The Increasing Importance of Transportation in Warfare
The importance of an adequate transportation system
to success or failure in military ventures or conquests dates
to antiquity. For example, the Romans developed a very com-
plex system of roads whereby, because of the resulting ease
of movement from place to place, they were enabled to hold
military, political and economic control over most of the
known world of that day„ However, because of a deficiency
in one portion of the total transportation system, this
prominent position was almost sacrificed. Even though the
Romans had a highly-developed land transportation system,
they lacked sea power. The Carthaginians, who were Rome's
chief rivals for world power and who were also quite efficient
sailors, were cognizant of Rome's water transport weakness,
11
and began to plan a naval engagement against Rome, The
Romans, becoming aware of this weakness in its transport system,
devoted intensive effort to its correction and by so doing de-
1 2feated the Carthaginian sailors.
One of the factors that probably contributed to the
failure of Napoleon I in his march across Europe was the inade-
quacy of the transportation system of the area, Napoleon failed
to consider the factor of "effective distance" or the ability
to move a particular distance, in a particular length of time,
in accordance with the type of transportation facilities avail-
able. Napoleon arrived in Moscow in midwinter 1812. Finding
the city deserted and being unable to transport supplies into
the area because of the great distance involved, he was obliged
to retreat. In making this withdrawal, he was forced, due to
the difficulty of moving across the muddy roads of Eastern
1 3Europe, to leave most of his heavy equipment behind.
Even though the nature of available transportation has
contributed greatly to the decisive outcome of the course of
events of some of the classic military campaigns of history, it
was not until that period following the advent of the Industrial
Revolution that transportation began to acquire the important
role which it has today in the total military machinery.
' 2 Lionel Casson, The Ancient Mariners (New York: Macmillan
and Company, 1959), p. 157-172.
13Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, "U. S. Army Services of
Supply," Academy of Political Science
,
Proceedings, XX (January,
1943), p. TKT,
12
The "Industrial Revolution," sometimes referred to as
the "transportation revolution," greatly affected the nature
of warfare, and the changed nature of warfare in turn created
for transportation a new role which it had not possessed
before. Modern warfare has become a "war of movement" 14
instead of a war of position as it once was. This "war of
movement" in actuality is an outgrowth of the Industrial
Revolution. Advancement in technological development brought
"mass production of munitions and foodstuffs, the railroad,
the steamship, the long-distance pipeline, the internal
combustion engine, eventually the transport airplane." 15 And
these in turn contributed the element of speed to the move-
ment of troops and military supplies.
Increase in speed of movement broadened the scope of
warfare and military campaigns became complicated and expensive
endeavors, whereas at one time they were, in general, rather
simple endeavors confined to limited areas. Rear Admiral
Henry £. Eccles in Logistics in the National Defense stresses
the importance of the contributions of the Industrial Revolution,
particularly those in the field of transportation, to changing
the nature of warfare. Eccles states that in the latter part
1 4 Joseph B. Eastmen, "Performance of the American
Railroad," Academy of Political Science. Proceedings. XX(Way, 1942-January, 1944 ), p. TUT!
*-
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43," United States
in World war II (Washington? U.S. Government Printing Office,
^bb;, p. 4.
13
of the 18th century the Industrial Revolution began to greatly
influence the nature of warfare. "By 1860 the railroad, the
steamship, and improved firearms were the most obvious military
fruits of the large scale, organized use of coal, iron, and
industrial machinery which characterized the first phase of the
Revolution. "' ° The latter decades of the 19th century saw
the increased development of the electrical and chemical indus-
tries and the internal combustion engine. It was these develop-
ments that formed the industrial background for World War One.
Finally, World War Two brought a climax to the pre-
nuclear phase of the scientific industrial revolution. "The
mass use of the internal combustion engine, of aeronautics and
electronics, and the advancement in chemical explosives provided
1 7
weapons and equipment of tremendous range, speed, and power."
Wartime Transportation Problems
In considering the role of transportation in war, it
should be stressed that transport and transport planning
encompasses much more than the logistical strategy employed
for the movement of people and commodities to, within, and
from the actual combat area. Factors such as the movement of
raw material to war production plants, the movement of semi-
16
17
Eccles, op. cit.
, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7
14
finished or finished products to points of fabrication, use
or embarkation, the movement of war workers to and from work,
in addition to the supply of the civilian population with
essential commodities, must also be taken into account.
Because of the multiplicity of demands and the complexity
involved in supplying these demands, a wartime transportation
system will be burdened with many difficult and sometimes
unique problems,
A nation's ability to confront new situations that are
created as a result of the occurrence of warfare may be closely
correlated with that country or area's state of economic develop-
ment. For example, there seems to be a covariation between
the stage of industrialization of a nation and the degree to
which that nation has developed its transportation system.
It is, of course, difficult to discern whether the growth of
industrialization in a nation is the result of the favorability
of a pre-existing transportation system, whether the establish-
ment of a highly-developed transportation system is the result
of the demands made by an expanding economy, or whether each
complements the other in its growth and development. Whatever
be the case, the construction of a highly-developed transporta-
tion system, one that will meet the demands of a wartime
situation, requires a tremendous amount of investment capital.
And a nation which is economically developed is more likely
15
to have surplus investment capital available than a nation
which has limited development in the fields of industrializa-
tion, commerce, or utilization of natural resources.
The economic situation of an area will not necessarily
fully indicate the scope of transportation problems or the
manner in which the problems will be approached for solution.
The political situation may largely indicate the general atti-
tude and approach that will be taken.
One of the situations with which an area will likely
be confronted during a war, as will be discussed later, is
the problem of organization for direction and control of
transportation. The type and extent of organization will
depend largely upon the nature of the political system of
any given area. For instance, in some areas, especially
those with a democratic political system, the government
may act mainly in the capacity of a co-ordinator endeavoring
to maintain a balanced flow of commodities via the available
transportation facilities, encouraging the expansion of
private transportation through favorable legislation or other
supporting measures, and attempting to balance supply and
demand so that the civilian and military segments will each
enjoy a fair share of the total available supply. On the
other hand, the policy may be less benevolent and the military'
may receive prime consideration at the expense of the civilian
16
or private segment. This should not be construed to mean
that under a system of benevolent government control the
civilian segment mill not have to endure hardship, because
it is evident that self-restraint and abstinence are often
required. But this should be viewed merely as an illustra-
tion that the policy of organization and direction of commodity
flow may tend to differ among differential political systems.
It should also be noted that in the actual field of military
operations coordination and control of transport facilities
will likely be a part of strategic logistic planning, and the
available facilities will more than likely be employed in
the manner that will best meet the logistically planned end.
A third factor which should be considered in relation
to the complexity and extent of transportation problems is
the factor of technological change. An area that may have
been adequately prepared to meet transport demands during
one period of time may find itself ill prepared during another
period simply because of technological lag or stagnation. As
the techniques of warfare have advanced, especially since
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, many new commodities
have become strategically important, and new military methods
and weapons have been initiated as a result of technological
change and invention. As the transport of these new commodities
becomes a strategic necessity and as new military methods and
17
weapons are initiated, it is found that the existing transport
system of an area may not be well adapted or may be inade-
quately prepared to meet the demands which are made of it.
For instance, the increased demand for petroleum, which has
become a strategic commodity of modern warfare growing out
of technological development, and the initiation of new
vehicles of warfare, such as the submarine, introduced many
variables to the field of transport with which it had not
hitherto been confronted, as will be illustrated in the
following chapter.
Finally, it can be pointed out that the spatial arrange-
ment of an area may also affect the complexity and extend of
transport problems. Territorial expanse, distribution of
population, opportunities for coastwise and inland water
transport, the distances of industrial centers from raw
materials and fuel supplies, and the "effective distance"
of an area in relation to the field of actual military opera-
tions are factors which may affect in one degree or another
an area's transport problem complexity.
Although the complexity and nature of transport
problems will differ from area to area according to the
interrelation of the factors of spatial arrangement, techno-
logical advancement, political philosophy, or economic
18
Klaus E. Knorr, The War Potential of Nations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956)
,
p~i T53,
18
development, there are nevertheless certain typical problems
that may develop. Such problems may involve change in demand
dislocation of the supply carrying capacity, the redistribu-
tion of commodity movement, or problems of organization for
the direction and control of transportation.
One of the most apparent problems which confronts a
nation's transport system when that nation becomes involved
in the activity of warfare is the marked change in demand
made of the available facilities. In some nations in the
past, it is found that the transport system, particularly
the civilian transport system, has been more often than not
designed to serve the normally expanding economy of the industry
and commerce of the nation; and little thought has been given
to the demands that might be made of that transport system
should a major war occur. During periods of peace, the
military traffic is usually a small percentage of that of
ordinary commerce; and national defense may require few
facilities beyond those established for the peacetime commercial
1 gpursuits provided some slack does exist in the system. Of
course, nations that stress the development of military
power for defensive of offensive purposes may have a trans-
portation reserve oriented around such power; and, if this be
1
9
L. C. Sorrell, "Transportation and the National
Defense," Journal of Business of the University of Chicago
,
XIV (1941), p. 237.
19
the case, that nation may be well prepared if a defense demand
situation arises. However, a transport system which is
oriented only toward serving immediate commercial or pro-
jected commercial needs may prove inadequate in a wartime
situation.
Increase in Demand
First of all, the transport system may experience an
increased volume of business "which results from superimposing
on the necessary civilian traffic a large military load, much
20
of which requires preferential movement." The total increase
in traffic which results cannot be calculated by merely esti-
mating the total quantity of commercial goods to be moved with
the addition of military supplies, but is to be calculated
rather by taking into account the commercial freight to be
shipped "plus an increment therein deriving from the increased
21
volume of business activity," which is usually to be expected
with the advent of war, plus the calculated military movement,
"and minus such losses as will follow the curtailment of non-
22
essential industries and activities."
Not only will there be an increase in demand taxing
the capabilities of the transport system, but there is also
likely to be a "conflict" in demand arising from the competitive
20,Herbert Ashton, "Problems of Wartime Freight Movement,"
Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science
,
CCXXX (November, 1943), p. 13,
21
22
Sorrell, loc. cit.
Ibid.
.
20
needs of the civilian and military segments. This conflict
may largely be due to the inability of a limited transport
system to meet the total demands of both segments, and
priority may have to be given to the one deemed most important
at the moment.
Dislocation of the Supply Carrying Capacity
A second problem that may develop is the occurrence of
a dislocation of supply carrying capacity, and this dislocation
may give birth to still another problem, the redistribution
of commodity movement. In a period of war, the supply carrying
capacity of certain transportation facilities may be diverted
to transporting commodities other than those more commonly
transported or to carrying larger quantities of certain commo-
dities at the expense of reducing the supply carrying capacity
for other commodities. Also, it is possible that the effective
distance of moving commodities via particular modes of trans-
port may be increased to such an extent that other facilities
must be substituted. The following passage from a report
by the United States Bureau of the Budget illustrates the
transport dislocation which occurred with the coming of World
War Two.
21
The swift advance of the Japanese on the rubber
producing areas, sinking of coastal vessels
—
especially tankers, growing shortage of gasoline
on the eastern seaboard, orders stopping the manu-
facture of motor vehicles for civilian use, man-
power shortages in the transportation field, curtail-
ment of civilian air traffic, growing obsolescence
of railway equipment and rationing of tires, auto-
mobiles and gasoline brought home to all the transport
dislocations of a many-front war. ^
An excellent example of the problem of transport
dislocation and traffic diversion during the war is that which
occurred along the coastal shipping lanes of the United States.
However, to eliminate duplication, this subject will not be
discussed at present, but will be examined later in Chapter
Three under "Pipeline of the United States."
Problems of Organization for the Direction and Control of
Transportation
The development of the problems of dislocation in demand
and supply carrying capacity may contribute to the development
of still another problem--the problem of organization and
coordination of transportation facilities.
In earlier paragraphs, it was pointed out that the
nature and extent of control or organization will probably
differ from area to area depending upon need or possibly upon
political policy. Even though this variation exists, there
may be some typical cases which call for some type of organization
23United States Bureau of the Budget, United States at
War
,
prepared under auspices of the committee of records of
War Administration by the War Records Section (Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 155.
22
and control. Two of the most typical are: controlling the
relationship between the government buyer and the seller of
transport services and organizing the civilian and military
demand.
In the first case, if the government is both the buyer
and seller of transportation, then only a minimum of additional
organization will probably be needed to coordinate the govern-
ment purchase of transport service for military purposes with
the government sale of such services, since the owner and
seller are one in the same. Of course, some value judgment
will have to be made as to how much will be allocated to the
military in light of a counter civilian demand that will more
than likely also be present.
If the government, in the purchase of transport services,
must rely on purchasing such services from private rather
than public sources, then coordination of purchase demand with
saleable supply may become quite a problem of organization.
Although a government may not actually own the transport
carriers operated within its jurisdictional limits, it is
usually desirable that a degree of centralization of authority
be obtained
24 Sorrell, op. cit
. ,
p. 251.
23
in the government military bureaus, and over the
various private transport companies, that the former
will not be under the necessity of dealing with a
multitude of suppliers, and the latter may avoid the « 5inconsistent and uncoordinated decisions of the former.
In other words, a type of central coordination must be effected
so that a working relationship can be established between the
seller of carrying services and government purchasing agencies
in such a manner that the availability of transport carriers
for given tasks at given times may be ascertained, and effective
mobilization can be procured on rather short notice.
A notable example of centralized coordination in the
field of domestic transportation was the establishment of
the Office of Defense Transportation by Executive Order in
December, 1941. The Q.D.T., as it was referred to, was
authorized to coordinate the policies and activities of the
various transport carriers— railroad, motor vehicle, inland
waterway, pipeline, air transport, and coastwise shipping.
It was also authorized not only to keep close watch on domestic
transportation, but to protect the interests of such transporta-
tion from undue infringement by other agencies of the govern-
ment and do all that was possible to "promote the maximum
27
utilization of transportation facilities." By this arrange-
ment, each of the transport facilities operated under its own
25
26
27
Ibid.
,
p. 250.
Executive Order Mo. 8989.
Bureau of the Budget
, op. cit.
, p. 158.
24
industrial management, and the O.D.T. had policing power,
rather than managerial power, to "cover every means of
transportation and penetrate to every detail of the opera-
tion in so far as it affects the war effort."
The second case of transport organization, the
coordination of civilian and military demand, usually stems
from the fact that a conflict of demand may develop when
only a limited transport capacity is available or when a
dislocation of supply carrying capacity has taken place, and
some system of priority must be developed and enforced so
that the most beneficial use can be made of the facilities
which are available. In some areas, as has been pointed out,
the policies of coordination may be such that the military
demand will be supplied largely at the expense of a neglected
civilian demand. But usually, however, civilian demand for
transport services will not be "entirely" neglected, and at
least a minimum of service must be afforded to the partial
fulfillment of this demand. Just what portion of the civilian
demand is most important and just what portion of this demand
is supplied will largely be left to the discretion of the
planning agencies. This discretion, of course, may differ
according to the nature of the strategic plans or military
objectives which have been laid down.
op
*°Ashton, op. cit.
,
p. 14.
CHAPTER III
THE NORTH AMERICAN PIPELINES
In the immediate chapter and in the following one,
an attempt will be made to present an overview of the major
pipelines that were employed as facilities for the movement
of commodities strategic to the allied war effort. Among
these facilities it will be found that some were employed
purely as military facilities, while others served the dual
purpose of supplying both domestic and military demand.
The subject matter of Chapter III will be confined
to the discussion of North American pipelines and petroleum
commodity flow. The author thinks it necessary to devote
an entire chapter to this area since this is the area of the
world in which the most extensive system of pipelines was
present at the beginning of World War Two and the area which
depended most on the pipeline as a facility for both domestic
and military use.
Two topic subjects will be considered herein? Pipelines
of the United States and the Canol Project. The space allotted
to Pipelines of the United States will be quite lengthy for
this section will be utilized to illustrate the concepts that
were presented in the previous chapter. In the remaining
sections of this chapter and those of the following an attempt
26
at such detailed application will not be made and therefore
those sections are much less lengthy. However, this does
not necessarily mean that the same or similar concepts can-
not be or will not be applied; but in some cases where the
application of concepts can be inferred from the descriptive
material, no attempt will be made to spend lengthy passages
making such application.
Pipelines of the United 5tates--East Coast Petroleum Supply
Since the total pipeline system of the United States
at the beginning of World War Two was vast and complex and
since an analysis of the entire system is almost prohibitive
in the space herein allotted, the author has chosen to limit
his discussion to East Coast petroleum supply, for it was
in this area that the pipeline probably played its most
crucial role.
The Spatial Arrangement
.
To understand the factors
involved in petroleum commodity flow to the East Coast, it
seems necessary to develop a basic concept as to the major
areas of petroleum production, the pattern of consumption,
and the methods of transport employed to move the commodity
from the areas of production to the areas of consumption in
the pre-war years.
27
Table 1 contains data of the production of crude
petroleum by state for the years 1940-1946. Among the
leading twenty-one crude oil producing states in 1940, all
of them, with the exception of California, Michigan and
Illinois, were situated in an area between the Rocky
Mountain system on the west and the Mississippi River on the
east. These sev/en states, with the addition of Michigan
and Illinois, accounted for approximately 80% of total United
States crude oil production in 1 940 j and with the addition
of California, the ten leading states accounted for approxi-
mately 96% of total United States crude oil production. It
is also interesting to note (see Table 1) that only one of
the states, Pennsylvania, generally designated as an eastern
seaboard state, appeared on the list of the leading crude
petroleum producers. And it accounted for only 1.3% of total
production in 1940, dwindling to barely more than 1% in 1943.
The twelve states of New England and the Middle Atlantic
Coast which produced less than 2% of the crude oil of the
United States in turn consumed more than 40% of the total
consumed petroleum fuels in the period prior to the war (based
on 1938 and 1939 statistics) and approximately one third of
United States consumption of petroleum fuels during the war
years. It is then evident, in comparing crude petroleum
production with consumption, that the petroleum fuel consumption
28
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demand of the East Coast states was greater than the production
of crude oil from which the petroleum fuels were refined.
Therefore, it is logical to assume that the area was forced
to supply its demand from other sources. This demand could
be supplied in two ways: from domestic or from foreign
sources. By examining supply and demand statistics, it can
be seen that foreign sources supplied only a small percentage
29
of total demand. Therefore, since foreign sources supplied
such a small percentage of total demand, it is then reasonable
to assume that the eastern seaboard states would obtain the
larger portion of their total supply from the oil producing
regions to the west, creating a need for interaction or
complementary movement between the area of production and
that of consumption.
Commodity flow Pattern
.
The next question which should
be asked is: What facilities were utilized in the implementa-
tion of the spatial flow of petroleum commodities between the
western producing areas and the eastern states. In the period
preceding the war, about 955$ of all petroleum deliveries to the
eastern states were shipped via coastal tankers and a few
barges originating from Gulf ports. Railroad tankcars, pipelines,
and other facilities accounted for only 5%. (See Figure 1)
29Of the total domestic demand in 1940, 5% was supplied
by foreign imports? in 1943, about 2%, Petroleum Facts and
Figures
, Eighth Edition, p. 10.
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Including the New Englanc^ Middle Atlontic, and South Atlantic States
and th» District of Columbia. ( Source* Bureau of Buget vv U.S. at V/ar " p. 155,
rVrroleum Administration for War p 83 fig. B)
Figure 1
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With the development of the war, there was a rearrangement
of the flow pattern. For instance, by 1943 barges and tankers
accounted for less than 20$ of such shipments, whereas rail
tank cars were carrying more than 50$ and pipelines approxi-
mately 25$. By April, 1945, in the later stages of the war,
pipelines accounted for 40$ of the delivery, tank cars 30$,
and barges and tankers approximately 30$. It will be the
purpose of the following section to analyze the factors which
contributed to this rearrangement of traffic flow, particularly
those that contributed to the increased use of the pipeline.
In the Introduction, it was stated that between the
two world wars United States pipeline mileage more than doubled
so that by 1941 there was 67,649 miles of crude oil trunk
lines, 9,903 miles of refined oil trunk lines, and 54,361
miles of crude oil gathering lines, or a total of 131,913 miles
of all types. The gathering lines carried petroleum from the
well area to storage centers, trunk pipelines, or railroad
loading areas; the crude oil trunk lines carried the petroleum
from the gathering centers to refineries or ports; and the
gasoline trunk lines extended from the refineries or ports
to points of distribution. "The location of gathering lines is
determined by the location of oil wells, but the trunk lines
are dependent also upon refineries and markets. "3°
^National Resources Planning Board, Transportation and
National Policy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Way, 1942;, p. 458.
32
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the spatial distribution
of crude oil and gasoline trunk lines in the pre-war era.
The most outstanding feature of Figure 2 is the heavy con-
centration of crude oil lines in the southwest, midwest,
and in California, with a conspicuous absence of such lines
in other areas. The rapid growth of pipeline mileage did
not include an expansion of mileage to the East Coast, In
fact, in this period there was actually a decrease in pipe-
line transport capacity with many pipelines being abandoned
or taken up. And many of the pipelines that continued to
be utilized had a reversed flow of traffic moving petroleum
westward from the coast toward the interior rather than in
the ordinary flow pattern from west to east. This reduction
in flow toward the coast was not due apparently to a decrease
in consumption in the area, for, as has been pointed out,
this area had a demand for about 40$ of the total petroleum
consumption of the United States and the total consumer demand
in 1941 was about 3.5 times greater than the consumer demand
in 1918. 31
The reduction of commodity flow via pipeline in the
interval between the two wars can largely be explained from
the viewpoint of production distribution and cost differential
of movement. During the first three decades of this century,
31 Fayette, op. cit.
, p. 95.
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there was a trend for petroleum production to shift more and
more to the southwest and eventually Texas became the primary
producing state, (Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana produced
more than 50% of the crude oil in this period.) The southwest
production region was conveniently located in relation to
the Gulf Coast ports both in terms of actual distance and
in terms, of transport cost. The data below are approximate
average total cost estimations of transport by pipeline, rail-
32
roads, tanker, and truck based on pre-war figures.
Railroad ...... . . . 8.3 mills/ton mile
Pipeline ........ 3.2 mills/ton mile
Tanker
. «o««ouooo .7 mills/ton mile
(gasoline
)
Tank Truck ........ 30 mills/ton mile
(hauls 100 miles or
more
)
Economics then confined the eastern movement of
Petroleum by railroad tank cars to relatively small
volumes of special products and the flow of oil in
pipeline systems in the East was mainly in a westerly
direction to inland destinations.
*
In view of transport cost differential, it is not surprising
that the definite flow pattern developed of transporting
petroleum by pipeline to the Gulf ports and then by coastal
tanker to the East Coast where it was then unloaded and distri-
buted to refineries or market areas.
32
33
National Resources Planning Board, op. cit.
,
p. 469.
W. Alton Jones. "Wartine Revolution in Petroleum Trans-
portation," World Petroleum, XIV (April, 1943), p. 31.
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Factors of Dislocation
.
With the coming of World War
Two, a definite dislocation and redistribution of petroleum
commodity flow occurred. In 1941, tankers transported
430,769,000 barrels of petroleum products from the Gulf Coast
to East Coast ports. (See Table 2) The following year, 1942,
this flow was reduced by about 70$, and by 1943 the total
petroleum carried by tanker was only about 15$ of what it
had been in 1941. It should also be noted that there was
an actual decrease in the total quantity of petroleum flowing
to the East Coast during this period.
Two factors are basically responsible for the reduced
flow by tanker: the diversion of tankers to other areas in
support of the war effort and submarine activity in the
Atlantic. Beginning with January, 1941, tankers carrying
petroleum between the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts were diverted
to other areas to replace tankers with foreign flags that
had been taken out of service. In May, 1941, 50 more carriers
were diverted into British service to replace the 182 that
she had lost to the enemy. It was expected that this loss
of tanker service would be recovered within a few months as
soon as new tankers were built to replace them 34 However,
with the occurrence of Pearl Harbor and the development of the
34 See Hearings before the Special Committee to Investi-
gate Gasoline and Fuel Oil Shortages, United States Senate,
77th Congress, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 156, p. 193
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war front in two oceans, the number of transport ships and
supply ships demanded by the navy began to increase. "It
became evident that it would be necessary to divert tankers
in increasing number to the movement of fuels for the fleets,
35
to various bases established overseas for the armed forces."
In addition, with the entrance of the United States into the
war there was an increase in German submarine activity along
the Atlantic Coast, In the first two months the submarines
caused little damage, but between February and May the enemy
sank 50 tankers along the Coast. "From then on until the
last year of the war, tanker deliveries were an insignificant
factor in supplying the oil needs of the East Coast. "3°
The dislocation of the major petroleum transport facility
deemed it necessary to redistribute the commodity flow to
other facilities--that is, if the ordinary demand was to
be supplied. As was concluded earlier, a definite redistribu-
tion did take place, as did a definite decrease in the total
quantity of petroleum being shipped. It was not until 1944
that the total movement again equaled the pre-war movement.
To understand the pattern of redistribution, it is
necessary to examine the factors of organization and coordina-
tion. The dislocation of supply carrying capacity created the
35
"War Emergency Pipeline," World Petroleum
, XIII
(December, 1942), p. 32.
36 John W. Frey and H. Chandler Ide (eds.), A History of
the Petroleum Administration for War
,
(Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1946), p. 87.
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need for substitution to fill the supply gap. The need for
substitution, in turn, inevitably created the necessity of
planning and co-ordinating a new transport pattern. And
the necessity of planning and co-ordinating a new transport
pattern involved the solution of such problems as: determining
which facility or facilities best fit the immediate need,
what type of integration of facilities should be effected,
should new facilities be constructed, and if so, what type
should they be.
Filling the Supply Gap . When the dislocation in
tanker traffic posed the problem of redistribution, "the
37
rails offered the most rapidly expansible substitute."
At the beginning of the war, 1941, there were slightly more
than 160,000 private and railroad owned tank cars in service
in the United States (See Table 3) of which approximately
149,500 were being used in the petroleum transport service.
When a petroleum shortage emergency becams apparent in the
Eastern states, "thousands of tank cars were drafted from
regional service throughout the country and assigned to East
38Coast service." By the end of 1942, the total number of
tank cars in service increased by only 2% over 1941 while
Jones, op. cit
. ,
p. 3037
3^In 1941 there were only 200 tank cars in service to
the East Coast, by 1943 this number had risen to 70,000. "Two
Pipelines for Sale," Fortune, XXXI (January, 1945), p. 126.
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the amount of petroleum shipped by rail increased by about
1 6%, This large increase in petroleum shipment in relation
to the increased number of tank cars in service can partially
be contributed to the system of coordination that was developed
to bring about the maximum utilization of equipment.
Moving crude and petroleum products [on a seven day
a week, twenty-four hour a day basis] in solid trains,
non-stop from producing and refining centers to bulk
distributing points in the East, the railway companies
. . .
increased the daily movement of oil from 10,000
barrels to over 800,000 barrels (1943), an achieve-
ment that was pronounced impossible before Pearl
Harbor. 39
Despite this intense implementation and utilization of railway
tank cars, "a shortage of 400,000 to 500,000 bbl/day remained
—
to supply civilian and military demands" (See Figure 4)
until 1944. Railroad deliveries began to taper off; and even
though a high degree of coordination had been developed,
deliveries themselves were rather irregular. For example,
•tank car deliveries averaged 840,000 bbl/day during September,
1942, but only about 750,000/day during October. 41 "With
other war work making claims upon the roads, oil schedules
became more difficult to maintain, and the tank cars them-
selves were increasingly laid up for repairs."
°^"War Transportation System Revolutionized to Meet War
Conditions," World Petroleum , XIII (November, 1942), p. 42.
^"Transportation Changes to Meet War Conditions,"
op, cit.
, p. 37.
41
42
Business Week (November 7, 1942), p. 20,
Fortune, loc. cit.
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The point should not be overlooked that in the search
for substitutes to fill the immediate supply gap, other
transportation facilities were taken into account and were
integrated into the immediate transportation scheme as far
as possible. The existing pipeline system, for instance,
was revamped so that it might more advantageously fit into
the transportation pattern. (See Figure 4) To increase
deliveries to the East, carrying capacity was enlarged? in
some cases, direction of flow on lines was reversed, and
other lines were converted from crude oil service (3,200 miles
of line). In addition, 2,300 miles were salvaged from systems
that were serving less useful service. As the war progressed
and demands increased, "the forecasts of future needs showed
clearly that no combination of the existing facilities could
44possibly meet all of the demands that were coming," The
need for new construction seemed inevitable, and in the
pipeline was seen the possibility of fulfilling this need.
Certain inherent advantages made the pipeline a suitable
facility for war transport, and the realization of the advan-
tages was probably a weighted factor in influencing pipeline
expansion. Below are a list of the inherent advantages as
enumerated in A History of the Petroleum Administration for War.
A T
Jones, op. cit.
„ p 31.
Prey and Ide 9 op. cit. , p. 100.
Governnienf Owned Crude L.nes ^^™^«
Government Owned Kef med Product I Line
I ndusf f y Owned Crude Li
EASTERN STATES PIPELINE SYSTEM
P.gure 4
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Its advantages, particularly in wartime, were
many: more work per pound of materials, 24-hour-
day service, virtually unaffected by the weather,
requiring very little manpower for operation, and
immune to submarines. *
Due to the limitations of this paper, a detailed
presentation and discussion of each project involved in
pipeline development and expansion is prohibited. However,
in the pages below the author hopes that he can create for
the reader a general concept of wartime pipeline develop-
ment through the presentation of an overview of the course
which such expansion and development followed.
A Summary of Pipeline Expansion . As early as the
first months of 1941 when the petroleum shortage first became
apparent, large East Coast oil companies suggested the
possibility of building large volume pipelines from Texas
to the Atlantic. That is, if the government would aid them
in securing necessary priorities, materials, and rights of
way in those states where the laws of eminent domain detained
construction. The development of the petroleum shortage
encouraged government officials,, such as President Roosevelt
and Petroleum Coordinator Harold Ickes, "to urge speedy legis-
lation giving pipelines authority to condemn rights of way
and offering financial aid to new construction if needed,"
and even to authorize government ownership.
* 5 Ibid
.
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"For More Pipelines," Business Week (May 24, 1941),
p. 8.
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Private oil interests had already proposed the
construction of two lines in the southeastern United States
so as to "assure a dependable source of petroleum products
. . .
in the event they should develop an interruption of
ocean tanker movement to the Atlantic Seaboard ports by
reason of any national emergency." The two lines were the
Southeastern line which was to extend 465 miles from Port
St. Joe, Tlorida, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the Plantation
line, a 1,261 mile line from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to
Greensboro, North Carolina. (See Figure 0) In the construction
of these lines, the pipeline companies ran into one basic
problem, and that problem was the acquisition of rights of way.
Laws of all states involved except Georgia and South Carolina
allowed to pipelines the right of "eminent domain." To over-
come this problem, congress was persuaded to pass the Cole
Act in 1941--an act which entitled oil companies to condemn
land and acquire rights for petroleum pipelines essential
to the national defense, upon certification of the President.
To aid the coordination of petroleum flow, an Office
of Petroleum Coordination for National Defense was created
in fflay, 1941. This office, under the direction of Harold
Ickes, in conjunction with representatives from the petroleum
48
4
'Hearings Pursuant to House Resolution 290 and House
Resolution 15, p. 80.
48
See Hearing Pursuant to House Resolution 290 and
House Resolution 15 and 188.
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industry, formed the Petroleum Administration for War. The
P.A.W. sponsored 27 projects, of which 21 were financed by
private companies and six were sponsored by the government.
In total the government spent 3187,000,000, and private
industry spent $69,000,000 on the development of these
various projects which involved the construction of "approxi-
mately 4,000 miles of new line, the reversing and converting
of some 3,250 and the dislocation of another 3,250 miles.
Of all the projects undertaken, probably the most
noted were the Big Inch projects, which involved the construction
of a 1,254 mile 24" crude oil line from Longview, Texas,
to the New York-Philadelphia area, and a 1,475 mile 20"
49products line from Beaumont, Texas, to New York-Philadelphia.
The first of these lines, the Big Inch line, was begun
in June, 1943. Due to a shortage of steel (only 137,500 tons
was allotted), the first section was laid to Ncrris City,
Illinois^ where it served as a supply source for tank trains
moving to the Eastern seaboard. "The loading terminal at
Norris City consisted of over a mile of loading racks with
50
seven miles of railroad tracks to serve." The tank cars
loading at Norris City reached a peak of 1,250 cars/day in
49 5ee Table 4
^"Emergency Pipelines--Their Record in Review,"
World Petroleum, XVI (June, 1945), p. 47.
TABLE IV
Big Inch
(Some factual data)
48
Length of Main Line (24" diameter)
Feeder and Distribution Lines
Total length of pipe in system
1 ,254 Wiles
222 Miles
1,476 Miles
Weight of pipe in System
Weight of Steel Plate in Storage Tanks
358,000 Tons
20,700 Tons
Number of pumping Stations
including Terminals
Number of Main and Branch Line
pumping units
Number of Auxiliary pumping Units
28
81
19
Number of Oil Tanks in System
Capacity of Oil Tanks
51
3,955,000 Bbl.
Volume of Oil Required to Till
Pipe in System
3,836,000 Bbl.
161,112,000 Gal.
Daily Throughput of "Big Inch"
Full Load
300,000 Bbl.
12,600,000 Gal.
Annual Throughput of "Big Inch"
Full Load
109,500,000 Bbl.
TABLE V
Little Big Inch
(Some Factual Data)
49
Length of Main Line (20" diameter)
Feeder and Distribution Lines
1,475 miles
231 Miles
Total Length of Pipe in System 1 ,706 Miles
Weight of Pipe in System
Weight of Steel Plate in Storage Tanks
Number of pumping stations
including Terminals
Number of main and branch line
pumping units
Number of Auxiliary pumping Units
Number of oil Tanks in System
Capacity of Oil Tanks
287,000
14,800
Tons
Tons
31
86
8
47
,860,000 Bbl.
Volume of Oil Required to Fill
Pipe in System
2,870,000 Bbl.
120,540,000 Gal.
Daily Throughput of "Little Big Inch'
Full Load
235,000 Bbl.
(gasoline
)
9,870,000 Gal.
Annual Throughput of "Little Big Inch"
Full Load
85,775,000 Gal
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early 1943. However, this activity was short lived and by
August 14, 1943, the Big Inch line had been extended to the
East Coast only 377 days after the first pipe was laid.
The Little Big Inch line, the first section extending
from Beaumont, Texas, to Seymour, Indiana, at a cost of
344,000,000, was begun in February, 1943, and was completed
in March, 1944, at a total cost of $75,000,000. These lines
constructed in record time were three to four times larger
in capacity than any built to that time; and by the end of
the war, over 316,000,000 barrels of crude oil and refined
products had been delivered to the Eastern seaboard through
51these and other connecting lines.
The expansion and development of this pipeline system
had several immediate effects which were self-evident, and
possibly some other which were not quite so evident at the
time. However, since the purpose of this chapter was basically
to create for the reader a descriptive knowledge of pipeline
utilization, an attempt to analyze the actual role of the
pipeline will not be undertaken here but later in Chapter IV.
The Canol Project
Whereas, the pipeline network of the continental
United States served as a means of supply both for civilian
51 Ibid., p. 51.
51
and military demand, in other areas similar facilities were
many times developed and utilized largely as a means to a
militarily planned end and were little used for supplying
civilian demand. The pipeline system that was developed
in North West Canada, the Canol Project, was an example of
such a system.
Of all the pipeline projects initiated during the war,
the Canol project is probably the most controversial from
the standpoint of necessity and the roll it actually played,
and was subject to several governmental hearings during the
time of its development and afterward. In the discussion
herein set forth, it is not the purpose of the author to judge
whether the project was right or wrong, but rather to present
as near as possible, in a brief summary, an accurate picture
of the project from a descriptive point of view. And in so
doing, it is hoped that an understanding of it as a facility
utilized for the spatial movement of commodities can be
developed. In painting this picture, the following topics
will be examined: the war situation and the dislocation of
commodity flow, the background and development of Canol,
and the utilization and abandonment of the project.
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The World Situation and the Dislocation of Commodity Flow
The sole justification sought to be advanced for
the Canol project [according to the War Department]
was military necessity, based on military appraisal
in the Spring of 1942 of the war situation and the
early need for oil products in the Alaskan area. ^
The war in the Pacific began in December, 1941, with the
bombing of Pearl Harbor and within the next few months Guam,
Wake, the Philippines, the East Indies, Singapore, and
portions of Burma fell under the control of Japan. This
meant a loss to the allies of the strategically important
oil fields of the Tar East. During the same period, the
Germans, as was pointed out previously, intensified their
submarine activity in the Atlantic, Gulf, Caribbean, and
Pacific. With the dislocation in shipping in the coastal
areas of the Atlantic and Pacific, an increased demand on
available ships for overseas service, and the movement of
the Japanese northward in the Pacific seizing control over
Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians, it appeared that the north-
west coast of North America could possibly be in danger.
And if such a situation did develop, it would be necessary
to effectively supply fuel for the planes, ships, and military
equipment used in the Alaskan Theatre. It was in this frame-
work of events that the plans for the Canol Project were formu.
lated.
•^Investigation of the National Defense, Special
Committee Pursuant to Senate Resolution 71, 77th Congress,
and Senate Resolution 6, 78th Congress. "The Canol Project,"
Report 10, part 14.
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The Background, Plan and Development of Canol
.
The
Canol Project was based largely upon the idea that an oil
reserve capable of meeting the military needs of the Alaskan
Theatre was present in the Canadian North West Territory.
Oil had been discovered in the area in 1888, and a number
of wells were drilled, beginning in 1918, in the Norman
Wells area to supply the local market. The local market
was largely confined to supplying local mining operations,
airplanes, and riverboats operating in the area. The market
area was large, encompassing thousands of square miles, but
market in terms of total volume of products was small. For
instance, in 1941 only 180,000 gallons of aviation gasoline,
112,000 gallons of motor gasoline, and 230,000 gallons of
53fuel were marketed from the wells.
With the intensification of the war in the Pacific,
two panaceas were suggested for supplying Alaska, which
occupied a position accessible only by sea or air. To
provide petroleum products, our supply problems encompassed
ports, storage roads, and pipelines as well as the avail-
ability of the products themselves. In the Spring of 1942,
there existed a shortage of petroleum on the West Coast of
the United States, a deficiency of tanker supply carrying
53 0. B. Hopkins, "The Canol Project," The Canadian
Geographic Journal , XXVII (November, 1943), p. 241.
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capacity to carry petroleum to Alaska, and a deficiency of
ship building facilities for construction of additional
tankers. 54 jhe two panaceas evolved to solve these problems
were: the construction of a highway by which commodities
could be moved overland from the continental United States
to Alaska and the construction of a pipeline system to
supply the road, airfields, and shipping facilities.
The logistical plan laid out by the Department of
Defense was for the further development of the Norman Wells
area and the construction of a pipeline from Norman Wells
600 miles across the Mackenzie-Yukon divide to White Hcrse
on the Alaskan Highway where a refinery was to be built to
process the crude petroleum into fuel and other refined pro-
ducts. In addition to the main pipeline, three products
lines were to also be constructed (See Figure 5): one from
the refinery at White Horse to the port at Skagway to supply
ocean-going vessels, a second from White Horse to Fairbanks,
and a third to Watson Lake airfield in the Yukon. In
constructing these facilities, a number of problems of uncer-
tainty had to be reckoned with. These problems involved
estimating how much oil was obtainable from the area and how
soon it could be attained, securing personnel and equipment,
Wallace Everett Pratt, World Geography of Petroleum
,
Published for the American Geographical Society by Princeton
University, 1950, p. 350.
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and moving transportation material and equipment over primitive
and inadequate facilities in a prescribed period of time. To
eliminate the uncertainty of the problem of potential oil
supply, It. General Brehan B. Somervell, commanding General,
Services of Supply, called for the exploratory drilling of
nine additional wells in the Norman Wells area. From this
exploratory drilling, it was then estimated that from 60 to
100 million barrels of potential oil supply was available for
use. However, it was "admitted that not all of this oil
might be obtainable since part of the oil-bearing structure
55lay under the Mackenzie River." With the completion of
the exploratory survey and drilling operations, the construction
of the project was ordefed to begin--to begin without adequate
knowledge of the total situation, as the Truman Commission
put it.
The recommendations were made without a survey of the
route of the projected pipeline and with no knowledge
of the conditions to be met except that mountainous
terrain, muskeg, and extremely cold winter temperatures
would present very difficult problems; without consider-
ing the number of pumping stations to be required; and
the most advantageous size of the pipeline for the pur-
poses required; without considering the possible alter-
native locations of the refinery; without considering
the costs and difficulties inherent in transporting the
materials and men and maintaining them at the project;
and without considering possible alternative methods
of obtaining oil products for the Alcan Highway, 56
^Stanley W. Dzuiban, "Military Relations Between the
United States and Canada, U.S. Army in World War Two , 1939-
1945 (Washington? U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 231.
U.S. Senate Special Committee Investigating the National
Defense Program, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 71 , 78th Congress,
1st session, Senate Report 10, p. 3,
, Oa«<^»•'' Landing fi«ld D
The Canol Pipeline System
Figure 5
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In June, 1942, 2,600 task force troops arrived at
Waterways, Alberta, 350 miles from Edmonton, to clear the
way for the construction of the proposed project. The
purpose of the task force was "to establish the transporta-
tion system to Norman Wells over which could move the
civilian construction organization and supplies needed for
construction of the pipeline."" Materials were transported
285 miles down the Athabaska and Slave Rivers to Fort
Fitzgerald, at which point there was a sixteen mile portage
around rapids, and from thence 195 miles down Slave River
to Great Slave Lake, 125 miles across the lake to the
Mackenzie River, and 550 miles down the river to Norman
Wells. 58
The pipeline itself was begun in the Summer of 1942;
and the work of blasting roads, building airfields, and
wharves and loading facilities continued throughout the
Winter. During construction, the engineers were confronted
with several problems peculiar to the northern area;
permafrost, muskeg, glacial action, and severe temperatures.
Permafrost, or permanently frozen subsoil, could neither be
thawed or moved. The only solution was to build over it and
insulate it to prevent thaw. The muskeg, or artic swamp area,
S^Dzuiban, loc. cit
.
58,Hopkins, op. cit.
, p. 243
58
was avoided as much as possible, but when needful, it was
crossed with curduroy, a rock fill, or piling. So-called
"glacial action" developed when warm springs, that were
flowing under a cover of moss and snow would break out to
the surface wherever they encountered an obstacle. If the
obstacle happened to be a road, the water would accumulate
in low spots and consecutive layers of ice would accumulate
until all traffic along the road was halted. Sometimes the
glaciers were "kept moving through culverts by fires in
gasoline drums; sometimes they were blasted out."^" Because
the frostline was about thirty feet underground, it was not
feasible to bury the pipe; therefore, it was laid on the
surface. An exposed pipeline in an area with extreme
winter temperatures created the problem of the control of
expansion and contraction and the maintenance of even flow
of petroleum. A fortunate factor is that "Artie oil has much
of the wax removed naturally in production by the cold earth,
and the pour point of Fort Norman oil is about -70°F.60
Upon completion in 1944, the Canol Project consisted of
a 577 mile long, four and six inch diameter main line, leading
from Norman Wells to the Alaskan Highway 80 miles south
of White Horse, 1,000 miles of overland road, seven
59,Richard C. Finnie, The Subartic Pipeline and Refinery
Project (1942-44) (San Francisco, 1945), p. 153.
60„
p. 33.
The Canol Project Opened," Business Week (May 6, 1944)
61 New York Times, October 13, 2:6, 1945.
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full-fledged major airfields and several emergency landing
fields. z Several supplementary pipelines radiated from
White Horse to the southeast, northwest, and south, and a
petroleum refinery was constructed to handle 3,000 bbl of
oil daily. 63
The Canol Project; Its Contributions . The final
question to be asked, and perhaps the most important one
from the viewpoint of this study, is what contributions
did the Canol Project make as a supplier of the war effort.
This question can be answered from more than one frame
of reference. From a restricted point of view, an evaluation
may involve only the examination of the actual material
contribution in terms of total petroleum products refined
and transported during the period of operation compared with
the cost of production and operation. When it went into
operation, "the Canol refinery was able to process 3,000
barrels of crude oil per day and produce from this crude
479 barrels of aviation gasoline, 1,918 barrels of motor
gasoline and 525 barrels of fuel oil." During the first
year of operation, 985,000 bbl of petroleum products were
produced. In addition to the 3134,000,000 initial expendi-
ture on the project, the amount allowed for producing oil
Richard Finnie, "Epic Canol," Canadian Geographic62,
Journal
, XXXIV (March, 1947), p. 139.
63.
64
Ibid.
, p. 137.
Dzuiban, op. cit.
, p. 235.
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averaged $3.70/bbl (33,551,790). Imperial Oil Ltd., the
operating company, received 20^/bbl, of which 50 was
rebated to the governments as rental on equipment, for a
net cost' of $144,750. And, in addition to this, $2.5
million was budgeted for the operation and maintenance of
the line, $2,694 million for operation of the parallel
road, and $3,284 million for operating the refinery. In
total, the cost of building and operating the project for
one year was approximately $142,622,750. (The system
65
operated from February, 1944, through June, 1945.) From
the viewpoint of economy, it is not surprising that Canol
received a great deal of criticism as being a poorly planned
project, because in actuality, output of oil and gasoline
in its one year of operation was approximately the same
amount that ten tankers could carry in the same length of
time
.
Those that have evaluated Canol from another frame
of reference, one that is based on factors other than those
of cost and total traffic flow, seem to view the project
in a more favorable perspective. The military stressed the
point that the project was a strategic logistical move and
65
"Retreat from Canol," Business Week (March 10,
1945), p. 24.
61
"no one should begrudge the fact that the war ended without
need of petroleum from Norman Wells to repel attack on the
Alaskan mainland, or help fuel the thrust at Japan through
Alaska. "66 jhe move according to this evaluation was "good
insurance, nevertheless, and did play an important part in
the wartime operation of the Alaska Highway and its air-
fields, "°* And, even though a full scale military operation
in the North Pacific never materialized against Japan, the
project did act as a fuel reservoir for Soviet lend-lease
planes being used on the European eastern front, and played
a role in opening the North West Territory to settlement.
Finnie, loc. cit.
67 Ibid
CHAPTER IV
MILITARY PIPELINES—EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE
The strategic pipeline system of North America
discussed in the previous chapter can be classified for
the most part as a "logistical" system, a permanent or
semi-permanent system constructed to provide large quanti-
ties of fuel to a rather stabilized area. However, in many
other areas of the world where pipelines were utilized by
the allies for the movement of petroleum products, especially
in fields of actual military operation, conditions were not
always as stabilized. Therefore, "assault" and "tactical"
systems rather than permanent "logistical" systems were the
most commonly used. An "assault" system is a temporary
type system "which can be quickly installed to provide
petroleum products to the using elements in assault or
rapidly moving combat situations.""" A "tactical" system
is one that can also be constructed rapidly "and is capable
of providing sufficient fuel for a corps or army "° 9 The
factors which differentiate the "assault" and "tactical"
type pipelines from the "logistical" are the factors of
speed of construction and permanency of use.
fiRDepartment of the Army, Military Petroleum Pipeline
Systems
, Technical Manual 5-343 (Washington, 1962), p. 8
69 Ibid.
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To facilitate speed of petroleum delivery, it was
necessary to develop new methods whereby petroleum lines
could be either constructed or dismantled and moved very
quickly. The technique developed was the portable military
pipeline, an idea conceived by 5yd Smith, pipeline chief
for Shell Oil Products Pipeline System of New York. The
military or portable pipeline which was "used first by the
United Nations [LJestern Alliens] in the African Campaign,"
was eventually developed into a system more than 10,000
miles in length in all theatres of war, and carried more
than 1Q% of the 50,000,000 gallons of gasoline being delivered
71to the forces overseas each day. The lines were so designed
that an army could pick them up and put them down where it
pleased in just a matter of hours, days, or months, depending
on length. The flexibility of the line made it easy for the
engineers to lay it over hills, through streams or curve it
around various obstructions. The typical pipe, which consisted
of 20 foot lengths of four or six inch pipes joined by
flexible couplings, weighed only 90 pounds per section and
72
was rather easily carried by truck, trailer or even mule-back.
7 n
Frank Love (Ed.), "Invasion Type Military Pipelines,"
Petroleum Engineer , XVI (April, 1945), p. 164.
71 Ibid
.
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"Nilitary Pipelines," Pipeline News , XVI, No. 2
(February, 1944), p. 17-31.
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Although the pipelines were portable and were constructed
of light weight pipe, there was little if any limitation
on the distance which they could be laid. J For example,
the India-China pipeline, which extended from Calcutta up
the Brahmaputra Valley through Assam and Northern Burma into
China, used this type of pipeline equipment.
These lines, which were used to transport high octane
aviation gasoline, lower grade gasoline and diesel fuel for
cars, tanks, jeeps, and other military equipment, were
designed so that the pressures could be used to control
flow. The flow was controlled in a manner so that, according
to Frank Love in the Petroleum Engineer:
regardless of length, terrain, and other complications,
it can be turned off at the delivery point like a
garden hose
. . ,
[and] automatic equipment so controls
the line that flow of product can be stopped at any
point without excessive pressures being built, and
immediately upon opening the valve at the point of
stoppage flow will be resumed. 74
Of the many portable or military pipelines utilized, a few
bear special mention. Instead of attempting a discussion
of each separate individual pipeline in the 10,000 mile
Allied system, the author will instead make a representative
selection and describe only some of the more notable facilities.
The pipeline systems selected for examination herein include:
73Love, loc. cit.
74 Ibid.
, p. 166.
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the Calcutta-ABC (Assam-Burma-China) line; the POL (Petroleum,
Oil, Lubricants) lines operating in Europe; and the PLUTO
project (Pipelines under the ocean), a modified version of
the standard portable pipeline.
The Calcutta-ABC Pipelines
The development of the Calcutta-ABC pipeline system
grew out of the demand for petroleum products perpetrated
by the campaign of the Allies against the Japanese in the
China-Burma-India Theatre of War. In 1943, "American and
Chinese soldiers were slowly pushing the Japanese back
through North Burma to remove the threat of a Jap-Axis linkup
across Asia, which would have proved disasterous to the
75Allies." The plan as formulated by the Allies was for a
double offensive, moving in on the Japanese from China and
India and virtually crowding them out of Southeast Asia.
To successfully carry out the plan of advancement, several
difficulties, many of them being principally concerned with
76
various logistical problems, had to be overcome.
The forces were for the most part operating in the
jungle and mountainous area of North Burma. And, because
overland transport facilities were largely lacking in the
75
"Building of the ABC Pipeline," Petroleum Engineer
,
XVI, No. 13 (September, 1945), p. 59.
Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, "The China-
Burma-India Theatre," The U.S. in World War Two (Washington?
U.S. Government Printing QfficeJ, pi 306 ff.
66
area, "air dropping had been their chief source of food,
guns, ammunition, and equipment. 11 '' However, this method
of supply proved inadequate since the "Japanese displayed
a tenacity which only tanks and heavier guns could overcome
78
without tremendous cost in , . . lives." To overcome
these difficulties of movement and to facilitate supply,
a logistical plan was formulated for the construction of
a road from Lido in Assam, the Lido or Stillwell Road, to
Burma where it was to connect with another road, the Burma
Road. This road in turn was to join Lashio with Chungking
in the Yunnan Province of China, thus opening up the area
for penetration from both India and China, (See Map)
To build such a road system, bulldozers, trucks, and heavy
equipment were engaged, creating an increased demand for
fuel products B The demand for fuel products for construction
equipment became so great that "by the time the [Tido] Road
was at the 50-mile mark, 40 per cent of all transportation
over it was trucks supplying this fuel."?9 This, of course,
cut down on its capacity to transport other goods? the
solution to the fuel supply problem was the construction
77
"Lido Pipeline a Tribute to American Engineers,"
op, cit.
, p. 6
78 Ibid
.
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"World's Longest Oil Pipeline," Op. cit.
, p. 6
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of a pipeline to supply both the troops and the roadbuilders
in the forward areas. 80 (See Figure 6)
Construction of the India-China Pipeline
.
The
pipeline constructed was divided into two sections. One
section was a six inch line which extended from the storage
terminals in Calcutta, where tankers delivered oil and
aviation fuel from the Middle East and other regions, "to
Tinsukia, in northern Assam, approximately 750 miles, where
it emptied into a large storage terminal." 8 ' The second
section "consisted of two 4" lines starting at Tinsukia
82
and ending at Kunming, China
. ,
.." This second line
was eventually used to collect petroleum products both from
the terminal at Tinsukia and the northeastern Assam petroleum
field near Dighoi and move these products to points of
distribution along the Lido and Burma roads.
Even though the India-China line was constructed of
light-weight portable invasion pipeline like that first
introduced in North Africa and later employed in Italy,
8u
"a pipeline to China had been authorized by the
Quebec Conference in August, 1943, but the order to construct
a line was not given until the construction supply problem
developed.
°1 "World's Longest Pipeline," Pipeline News , XVII
(Way, 1945), p. 18,
82 Ibid.
R T
This second was never actually completed to Kunming,
but it did extend into the Yunnan Province.
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Trance, and other areas of Western Europe, the problems
of construction encountered and the engineering technology
employed was quite different. In fact, the role of man in
the construction of the line itself seems to be a rather
remarkable achievement in light of the many problems and
engineering difficulties that had to be overcome before
its completion. The line was built "over rivers that had
never been bridged, over hills that towered 9,000 feet, and
over swamps that had never been pierced by any but wild
animals." 84 And this was done in spite of "the torential
monsoon rains, the limited facilities, the difficult
communications, and the shortage of personnel." 85
The India-China System as a Facility for Commodity
Flow
.
The author feels that the important objective here,
however, is not to place emphasis on the technology of
construction per se, but rather to emphasize the system
basically from the viewpoint of its use as a facility for
fl 6
commodity flow. In its capacity as a facility for commodity
flow, the system played a three-fold role: (1 ) as a support
facility; (2) as an implement for the redistribution of
commodity flow; (3) as a direct source of fuel to the field
of military operations.
84
"World's Longest Oil Pipeline," Mining and Metallurgy
,
XXVI, No. 465 (September, 1945), p. 428.
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"World's Longest Pipeline," op. cit.
, p. 20.
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Just as the building of the Lido-Burma roads were
deemed necessary by the military logisticians before the
Japanese could be driven out of northern Burma, "so was
the pipeline necessary before the road could be completed
to do its job, w °' In its capacity of supplying the construc-
tion crews operating the bulldozers, trucks, and other heavy
equipment, the pipeline became an implement of support
contributing to the completion of another logistically
planned supply facility, a road. The need for such a support
facility was probably the primary incentive behind the initial
order to begin work on the pipeline, even though the plan
for such a pipeline had been formulated earlier at the Quebec
Conference
.
In its role as an implement for the redistribution
of commodity flow, the pipeline had the effect of displacing
"planes and road transport from the heavy chore of carrying
op
gasoline," and in so doing released these facilities so
that they could be utilized for carrying other goods. For
instance, "the maximum output of the two 4" lines [was] nearly
on
equal to the carrying capacity of 400 cargo trucks."
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"World's Longest Oil Pipeline," loc. cit.
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"World's Longest Pipeline," op. cit.
,
p. 14.
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Ibid.
,
p. 18.
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In any twenty-four hour period, the lines had the possibility
of delivering 8,000 barrels or 336,000 gallons of fuel.
The potential carrying capacity that was released could
then be diverted to hauling guns, ammunition, food, and other
essentials. Moreover, it was possible for them to refuel
from the pipelines as they traveled instead of carrying fuel
with them, this also creating additional capacity for the
movement of other commodities,
finally, the pipeline fulfilled the role of being
a direct source of fuel to the fields of actual military
operations. In this capacity, the pipelines, in the early
stages of their development, carried fuel to the various
distribution centers and airfields of the Northern Combat
Area Command. In May, 1944, "the first aviation gasoline
arrived at the strategic air base of Shingbwiyang, "™ and
by the middle of June, "100-octane gasoline was being furnished
to fighter planes and bombers at every airstrip then in the
91
combat zone." While the north Burma campaign was still
in progress, the engineers were planning the final extension
of the system into China, This final link was constructed
by crews working simultaneously from both Burma and China.
90„,
'Jorld's Longest Oil Pipeline," loc. cit.
91 Ibid.
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"Simultaneous work on the pipeline from both directions was
a necessity because the pipeline engineers could not by-pass
the men doing the actual fighting. "^^ The final section of
the line was completed in the early spring of 1945, and "the
first gasoline arrived at a major Chinese-American air base in
93China on April 9, 1945," approximately eighteen months after
94
the initial construction of the 1800 mile line was begun.
(See Table 6 for total delivery made by pipeline to China.)
Europe— The POL Lines
It was, however, on the western front rather than in
the China-Burma-India theatre that the military pipeline
was first used as a tool of logistic strategy. In fact,
it was here that the portable invasion type line was intro-
duced. As the war progressed through North Africa, Sicily,
and Italy, pipelines were used to lessen the strain on the
limited motor and rail facilities. "Movement of the vast
quantities of 100-octane gasoline for tanks and vehicles
was possible only because of pipelines, since neither tank
cars nor tank trucks were available in sufficient numbers."
"Building of the ABC Pipeline," op. cit.
,
p. 61
92
q t
^ J
"Lido Pipeline A Tribute to American Engineers,"
°P. cit. , p. 9.
"^For a summation of total gasoline deliveries by pipe-
line to China in the latter stages of the war, see Table 6.
nc
Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson. "The Transportation
Corps: Operations Overseas," The U.S. Army in World War Two
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957;, p. 226-227.
table: vi
Gasoline Deliveries by Pipeline to China
In Gallons
(1945)
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Month 100-Octane Motor Gas Total
April 122,072 122,072
Way 671,440 643,000 1 ,514,440
June 138,919 1,270,200 1 ,417,119
July 1,684,130 1,495,200 3,179,330
August 1,873,760 1,113,735 2,987,495
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In southern and central Italy, for instance, pipelines were
constructed inland across the mountainous terrain "to
supply the American and the British Bth Army during the Italian
campaign." In order to facilitate speed of construction,
pipelines were laid on the surface; and all available equip-
ment, including "Italian storage tanks left behind by the
retreating Nazi, were rebuilt and additional portable tanks
97
were constructed."
Deliveries of petroleum products were made by pipeline
from Taranto, Bari, and |Y|anf redonia in the southeast to Allied
airfields in the Foggia area, while other lines were constructed
inland from Naples to supply the troops on the west coast.
Both four inch and six inch portable lines were used. The
four inch had a capacity of 4,000 bbl. of gasoline/day and
the six inch almost 12,000 barrels/day. "By December 22,
1943, gasoline was being pumped over two pipelines from Naples
98to Calni Risorta twenty-five miles beyond." The capacity
of the dual line system was 260,000 gallons/day, which filled
the requirements of the Fifth Army. "During January, 1944,
the utilization of this double pipeline saved an average of
50 railway cars daily, or from 250 to 300 trucks." 99
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"Building of the ABC Pipeline," op. cit.
, p. 64.
97 Ibid.
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, p. 277,
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POL Supply
. It was not until the period after D-Day,
however, that the European military pipeline system had its
greatest facility development, and that as a part of the POL
Supply system. D0 The POL (Petrol, Oil, Lubricants) supply
system for Western Europe was conceived as part of operation
"Overlord," the code word which came to be applied to the
general concept of a cross-channel invasion in 1944. "POL
alone accounted for one quarter of all the tonnage transported
to the European Theatre of Operations." And because of this,
it is not surprising that "POL supply enjoyed pre-eminence in
the planning and preparation for overlord matched only by
1 02the plans for port reconstruction."
A chief focus point in planning the supply of POL was
the possibility of utilizing lightweight pipelines that could
be constructed rapidly and that would supply a constant flow
of "petrol" to the invading troops. Planning for such a system
began as early as 1942, but it was not until late in 1943
that a clear outline began to emerge. The outline called for
a bulk breaking point at Port-en-Bessin , a frency city which
lies between Cherbourg and The Havre on the English Channel.
Here POL was to be moved from tankers via ship-to-shore
100
101
POL: British army jargon for "Petrol, Oil, Lubricants."
Roland G. Ruppenthal. "Logistical Support of the
Armies. The European Theatre of Operations." The U.S. Army
in World War Two
,
2 Vols. (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1953), p. 319.
102 Ibid.
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pipeline to storage facilities on shore or by a single four
inch pipeline to St. Lo. A similar bulk breakpoint was
planned for Cherbourg from which POL was to be delivered
southward via three six inch pipelines to La Haye-du-Pints,
Avranches, and Laval, then eastward via two six inch lines
1 03to La Mans. This routing was, however, changed somewhat
to conform with changes in the tactical strategy of the
overlord military campaign. (See Figure 7)
"On D-Oay the first wave of motorized equipment was
fueled on the beach from big fifty-five gallon drums."
But this condition was only temporary, as engineers soon
constructed pipelines from tankers lying off-shore to big
storage tanks being set up on or near the beach head. After
the storage tanks were set up, the engineers began the task
of laying pipelines inland. The laying of the lines progressed
at a somewhat slower rate than planned. "Quite frequently
the work was done under gunfire and air raid attacks [an^D
the crews were never certain just when they would explode
a hidden mine along the right-of-way." 105 Secondly, because
03 See map of Overlord Plan.
104,
"POL: Gasoline and Oil Carried Right up to Front
Lines in Europe," New Yorker
,
XX (September 23, 1944), p. 16,
105 W.C. Piatt. "Pipelines in France Created Under
Fire Sheds Growing Pains," National Petroleum News , XXXVII
(January 10, 1945), p. 16
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of the limited supplies moving into France and the variety
of demands from different sources for these supplies, "the
pipelines had their troubles in locating their equipment
and getting it to where it was needed on time and with no
parts missing."* 06 But in spite of these difficulties,
"when the first allied troops entered Paris, the pipeline
1 07
was only thirty-five miles behind them."
Figure B shows the total POL pipeline systems con-
structed before and after February, 1945. The five separate
systems within the larger total POL system included: the
major or Central system which entended south and east from
Cherbourg to St. Lo, Chartres, Coubert, Thilonville, and
finally to Manz on the Rhine; the southern system from Etang
de Berre in southern France north and east to Frankenthal,
Sandhofen, and Mannheim on the Rhine; the minor system which
connected Port-en-Bessen with St. Lo and the major line; the
Seine system composed of a number of short connecting distri-
bution lines along the Seine River; and, the Northern system
with its terminal point at Antwerp in Belgium extended south-
east to Maastricht and then north and east to UJesel on the
Rhine.
Ibid
.
107
POL; Gasoline and Oil Carried Right up to Front
Lines in Europe," loc. cit
.
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"On its completion, the continental network--including
the Seine and Minor systems
. . ,
had a route distance of
1,412 miles and had 3,477 miles of pipe. Storage facilities
1 OB
totaled 7,619,116 barrels." Each of these lines, for the
most part, followed the movement of allied troops, carrying
both high-octane aviation fuel, tank fuel, and lower grade
gasoline and diesel fuel for automobiles, jeeps, and bull-
109dozers.
The typical flow pattern was somewhat similar for
each of the lines. The POL products were first moved into
coastal areas via tankers, at which point a break in the flow
pattern occurred, and the products were transferred to shore
via ship-to-shore pipelines where they were deposited in
large storage tanks. From here the products were pumped
through the long-distance military lines into the front areas.
"Somewhere near the front, the fuel.
. .
(nas[| pumped into
110drums or tank trucks as conditions required." There were,
as might be expected, deviations to the standard flow pattern.
For instance, in the areas of western France that were served
by operation PLUTO, POL products were pumped through pipelines
across the channel, thus omitting the tanker ship-to-shore
Ruppenthal, op. cit
. ,
p. 438108,
1 09Lubrication oil was too heavy to be sent through
pipelines.
110„p 0L . Gasoline and Oil Carried Right up to Front
Lines in Europe," loc. cit.
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operation. In the later stages of the war, before the six
inch Thilonville-Mainz line was completed, POL was trans-
ferred from pipeline to tank truck at Thilonville or
Birkenfeld and carried by tank truck to the Rhine River
where it was pumped across the Rhine through two six inch
pipelines to the field of operations.
Operation PLUTO
In planning POL deliveries to the continent, the
Allies also considered the idea of developing submarine
pipelines to span the English Channel. The United States
Corps of Engineers and the British both conducted experi-
ments with underwater petroleum movement. However, the
United States submarine pipeline experimentation project
was abandoned, and it was the British who "developed cables
that could be laid underwater and that would carry POL under
111high pressures." Lord Louis Mountbatten, head of combined
operations, first suggested the idea in 1942, when he asked
Geoffrey Lord, British Minister of Petroleum Welfare, if a
11?line could be laid across the Channel. There was some
doubt if such an operation could be performed. Nevertheless,
experimentation was begun and two new types of line were
111 Ruppenthal, op. cit
. ,
p, 323.
112
"0peration Pluto," Oil and Gas Journal, XLIV
(June 2, 1945), p. 56.
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developed specifically for the submarine channel operations.
The Hais cable, a three inch hollow cable, "something like
a submarine electric power cable but without cores and
A A «T
insulation" was capable of operating under pressures of
more than 1,200 lb/sq. inch. "The fact that the cable was
hollow increased the difficulties jcTf laying. iT] for it was
114likely to kink and so stop the oil flow," To minimize
kinking, cables were inflated with water before they were
laid.
The second submarine type line was the Hamel welded
steel pipe, a lightweight pipeline composed of 20 foot
lengths of three inch diameter steel welded into lengths of
4,000 feet. To lay these pipes, a floating drum "capable
of carrying the full length of pipe required for the channel
115
crossing." The floating drums, called "conundrums," were
90 feet long, more than fifty feet in diameter, and when
fully wound with pipe weighed 1,600 tons, or approximately
1 1 f->
the weight of a destroyer.
When the testing of the submarine pipes had proved
successful, tentativ/e plans were formulated to lay ten three
113
"Pipelines for Pluto," Uelding Engineer , XXX
(July, 1945), p. 49.
114
"Operation Pluto," Petroleum Engineer , XVI
(June, 1945), p. 170.
15
"Pipelines for Pluto," op. cit.
,
p. 50.
1 1 fi
. J. E. Oldham, "Operation Pluto," Engineering and
Contract Record
, LVIII (July, 1945), p. 77.
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inch cables from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg, the first
line to arrive 12 days after D-Day. In its final revision,
operation PLUTO included 21 lines. (See Figure 9) Force
PLUTO with its homebase in Southhampton and Tilbury was
connected with the 1,000 mile pipeline system of Great
Britain. The fuel was carried from the British system to
the coast where special high pressure pumping stations,
cleverly camouflaged, were used to pump the petroleum
117
through the submarine system to the continent.
On August 12, 1944, within a few days after D-Day,
operation PLUTO officially began with the laying of lines
from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg on the French coast.
But these lines were only of short duration and were abandoned
"when the Allied Armies rapid advance along the French coast
made it necessary to concentrate all efforts on the Dungeness
lip
crossing. » °
The second group of lines were laid across the narrowest
part of the channel and connected Dungeness on the British
117
One pumping station "was in a row of blitzed houses
at Sandown, on the Isle of Wightj another was in an old fort
built in the 1860's against possible invasion by Napoleon III,
and others were in a modern amusement park and in seaside
villas at Dungeness." "Operation Pluto," Petroleum Engineer
,
(June, 1945), p. 174.
1 1 B
"Pluto," Institute of mechanical Eng ineers, Proceed-
ings, CLIV, no. 4 (1946), p. 43?.
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coast with Boulogne on the French coast. Each one of the
three inch lines could deliver about 120,000 gallons, or
400 tons, a day. "Eventually eleven Hais and six Hais-Hamel
lines were laid with a capacity of more than 4,500 tons,
or 1,350,000 gallons a day; and 1,000,000 gallons a day
1 1 Q
were pumped across for many weeks." At Boulogne PLUTO
made connections with other lines (See Map) through which
petroleum products were pumped to Calais, Ghent, and Antwerp
where it joined the northern POL system.
In its role as a facility for supply, the PLUTO
system was less conspicuous, and by being so was less vulner-
able to air attack than the tankers traveling the Channel
route. However, the Allies were cognizant of the fact that
a last moment rush of submarine activity might damage or
destroy the lines, and kept duplicate lines in reserve to
replace any that might be damaged or made inoperative.
From August 12, 1944, to Way 8, 1945, PLUTO was responsible
for supplying about 120,000,000 gallons of gasoline to the
Allies in Europe. In the words of the Quartermaster-General,
PLUTO not only supplied the forces of Europe, but it was also
employed as a facility for tanker displacement. An in so doing
it saved a very large tanker tonnage which was badly
needed in the East. Thus PLUTO had a reaction which
extended all over the world. 120
119 Ibid.
,
p. 438.
120 Ibid.
CHAPTER V
THE PIPELINE--AN INTEGRAL PART OF
THE TOTAL TRANSPORTATION SCHEME
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to analyze
the overall role of the pipeline in terms of its character
and its utilization. Up to this point, much of the material
presented has been of a descriptive nature, and little
attention has been paid to the salient characteristics
which contribute to the suitability of the pipeline as a
facility for commodity movement. In the paragraphs below,
the author has compiled a brief listing of some of the
characteristics.
Salient Characteristics of Pipeline Transport
According to the Army Technical Manual on Military
Pipeline Systems, some of the advantages of moving liquid
fuels within the theatre of military operations by pipeline
are effectuated by certain characteristics inherent to the
pipeline. For example, "adverse weather conditions do not
present as many serious problems to pipeline operation as
1 21they do vehicular transport," Rain, snow or flood can
detain petroleum flow by tank truck or other mobile facilities,
121 Department of the Army, op. cit
. , p. 7,
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whereas the pipeline which is a fixed facility is little
affected by these elements of nature. However, it must not
be overlooked that weather conditions may hinder construction
and repair work on the line. Secondly, because of their
flexibility, pipelines can be constructed over adverse
terrain where major roads or railroads would be difficult
to construct. And this construction, particularly where
portable military lines are used, can be facilitated much
more rapidly than that of the road or railroad because only
a minimum of change in the physical landscape is usually
needed. Thirdly, pipelines are well adapted to camouflage
techniques. They can be located to take advantage of
natural cover. As a result, pipelines and their pumping
122
stations are relatively immune to successful air attack.
Tank trucks and other vehicular facilities are more open to
detection; and if a convoy is attacked and destroyed, the
supply line may become virtually paralyzed. If pipelines
or their pumping stations are attacked, they can be repaired
or replaced more quickly than some other facilities. Since
even though several sections can be put out of operation,
it would bo difficult to destroy the whole facility. If a
pipeline is well designed, with sufficient tankage at
22 Ibid.
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intermediate points, line breaks will not necessarily
cause complete shutdown of the line. Even marine-terminal
installations which might make good targets for enemy attack
can be so camouflaged or concealed that risk of attach can
be kept at a minimum. The methods employed to conceal the
marine-pumping stations of operation PLUTO are exemplary of
such camouflage techniques.
In addition to the specific characteristics which
make the pipelines suitable for utilization within the
theatre of military operations, there are also other character-
istics which may affect the pipelines position both in the
field of military operations and in other areas as well.
First of all, the pipeline makes the handling of flow one
simple, continuous operation. Because the handling of oil
flow is a rather simple, continuous, and almost automatic
operation, little labor or man-hour expenditure is involved.
The pipeline which can replace several propelled vehicles
and which eliminated the need for drivers to steer these
vehicles, demands only a small crew to maintain the pumping
stations and/or to repair the line. In a period of total
conventional war such as World War Two when the economic
distribution of man-hours may be a crucial factor, the
minimization of labor demands in the area of pipeline operation
89
may add strength to other operational areas that have
greater labor demands, or may aid in filling a man-hours
gap in those areas where there is a labor deficiency.
The directional nature of commodity flow is another
factor which should not be overlooked. Vehicular type
transportation facilities usually have the ability to
carry on a two directional traffic flow; collecting commodi-
ties at one point, transporting these commodities to the
point of destination, and picking up other commodities and
delivering them to the original point of origin or elsewhere.
A pipeline is basically a one directional facility. Its
very nature would suggest such a situation since liquid can
be pumped only one direction at a time through a pressurized
pipe. If flow were to occur in the opposite direction,
the pipe would have to be cleared of the first liquid; a
second liquid product would have to be introduced, and the
pumping system would require a reversal. In one perspective,
the "one directional" nature of the pipeline can be considered
as a disadvantage, for it gives the facility a rigid character,
restricting its flexibility of use. From a different perspec-
tive, however, "one directional" flow might be considered
advantageous. For example, in the coordination of petroleum
movement by rail between the southwestern production area
of the United States and the Atlantic Coast consuming area,
in the early stages of the war, stress was placed on moving
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the maximum amount possible in the shortest period possible.
To bring about this goal, large numbers of empty tank cars
were moved from the consuming areas in the East to the
production areas in the West. This necessitated the expensive
and time consuming task of transporting unused dead-weight
tonnage. The pipeline, of course, with its one directional
flow, eliminates such a necessity.
Pipelines may also add a measure of certainty to
commodity flow. In a period of war, a rather exact knowledge
of potential petroleum transport capacity may be of strategic
importance both to the civilian and to the military consumer.
The pipeline provides the consumer with both a knowledge of
available transport capacity, since it is a fixed facility
with a fixed capacity subject to very little flow deviation,
and with a knowledge of "where the oil is, and what delivery
123
schedule can and will be maintained." Of course, it
should not be overlooked that another prerequisite for certainty
of flow is "that there be a fairly large and consistent volume
124
available for an extended period." A mere knowledge of
the fixed capacity without a knowledge of the commodities
available to move via the capacity will in itself create
uncertainty.
123
Hugh N, Emerson, "Salient Characteristics of
Petroleum Pipeline Transportation," Land Economics
, XXVI
(1950), p. 38.
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A final factor to be mentioned is the factor of cost.
In an earlier section, a differential transport cost table
was given (See Page 35) in an effort to explain the petroleum
flow pattern between the crude oil production regions of the
southwestern United States and the consumption areas along
the Atlantic Coast. One conclusion that can be drawn from
comparing this table with Figure 1 is that in a peacetime
situation there seems to be a tendency for commodities to
flow via those means of transportation that have the lowest
ton-mile costs. However, in a war situation strict monetary
costs may be of minor consideration, whereas matters of
strategic position may attain precedent so that more expensive
supply facilities may be utilized if the logistician feels
that such utilization will best contribute to the accomplish-
ment of the established military goal, for example, the
justification offered by the military logieticians for the
construction of the Canol Project was based on such a concept.
Conclusions
It is evident from the study that the pipeline played
not one but a multiplicity of roles in its capacity of
supplying the war effort. After examining the material
carefully, the author has concluded several important roles
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which he believes the pipeline to have played and has arranged
these into the following list.
1. Filled a "supply gap" in some areas where there
was a displacement or interruption of normal
commodity flow,
2. Reduced the "effective distance" of commodity
flow.
3. Implemented the redistribution of commodity flow,
4. Acted as a support facility for other modes of
transportation.
5. Supplied reserve potential.
6. Contributed to the advancement in design, construction
and technology of petroleum transportation equipment.
The reader should remember, in considering each of these roles,
that it is not necessarily a separate entity in itself, but
at times it may be closely interrelated or almost inseparable
from one or more of the other roles.
A Filler for a Supply Gap . The first conclusion was
derived from the study of the pipeline system of the United
States. When coastal petroleum movement was interrupted
and there was a displacement of normal commodity flow, a
"supply gap" was created and for a time there was an actual
decrease in total quantity of flow between the production and
consumption areas. Other facilities of transport, including
the pipeline, were substituted, and through this substitution
the supply gap was eventually filled.
93
A Reducer of Effective Distance
.
Effective distance
or transportability, as defined in an earlier section, is
the ease of movement in virtue of the type of commodity
being moved and the facilities available for its movement.
The greater the effective distance, the greater the diffi-
culty there will be in effecting interaction between spatially
separated areas. Every pipeline system studied within this
paper was in some respect an implement which contributed to
the reduction of effective distance. For example, when the
effective distance of moving commodities along the coast of
the United States was increased with the advent of German
submarine activity, the pipeline facilitated a decrease in
effective distance by offering a mode of movement virtually
immune to the submarine. In Southeast Asia when the factors
of isolation, jungle vegetation, and mountainous terrain
hindered ground mobility, the pipeline reduced the difficulty
of movement by supporting the construction of other transport
facilities, by offering a flexible implement for movement
across areas where the use of a less flexible implement would
have been difficult, and by redistributing commodity flow
in such a manner that other facilities could be used more
readily for the movement of troops, equipment, and other
supplies essential to military operations.
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Implemented Redistribution of Commodity Flow. In
this capacity, the pipeline performed a dual role. One,
it served to relieve the burden placed on other facilities
by the increased demands of war. Secondly, it released
these facilities to perform other essential supply activities.
In Chapter III it was pointed out that war usually creates
an increased demand for many commodities. With the occurrence
of an increased demand or with the dislocation of supply
carrying capacity, some transport facilities may receive a
disproportionate share of the total commodity movement. The
railroads of the United States, for instance, in the early
stages of the war had a rather rapid increase in total freight
movement. This increase was probably due to the dislocation
of coastal tanker traffic and to the increased demand for
equipment supply and troop movement. The pipeline aided in
the reduction of this burden by providing a substitute for
fuel transportation.
The pipeline not only relieved the burden of increased
commodity flow, but also released "a large number of vehicles
125
and personnel for other essential supply activities."
In the Italian theatre and in the China-Burma-India theatre,
the military pipelines released as many as 400 trucks per day
from fuel transport. The release of these trucks and of the
125Department of the Army, loc. cit.
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labor required to maintain them provided additional carrying
capacity and potential available man-hours to be used in
other fields of operation.
A Support Facility
.
The pipeline also played a two
fold role in its capacity as a support facility: (1) It
offered support to the construction and operation of other
transportation facilities; (2) It became a connecting link
between other facilities being utilized for the transport
of strategic commodities.
In certain areas, such as Southeast Asia and the North
West Territory of Canada, one of the important roles of the
pipeline was in offering support to the construction and
operation of other transport facilities. For example, in
the China-Burma-India theatre,, the pipeline supported the
construction crews working on the Burma and Lido Roads and
was, of course, also utilized for supplying the military
convoys moving overland and the various airfields scattered
throughout the area. In the North West Territory of Canada,
the pipeline system supported in a limited way the trucking
facilities operating over the Alaskan Highway, Soviet,
American, and Canadian Aircraft, coastal tankers, and other
ocean-going vessels operating in the Pacific area. Support
such as this was, of course, given in all the other areas
96
of operation. However, a discussion of each individual
area does not seem necessary at this point, so only the
above two examples will be given.
In the European Theatre, and in other areas, the
pipeline was utilized as a link connecting other integral
parts of the total transportation system and promoting a
rather even almost uninterrupted flow system. The POL lines
were, for instance, connecting links between the tanker
service operating along the coast of Europe and the military
convoys operating in the interior of France, Belgium, and
West Germany,
A Supplier of Reserve Potential . The utilization
of the pipelines, in most cases, was an "active" utilization.
However, in some specific instances, such as in the Canol
system, the pipeline did not serve so much as an active
supplier of petroleum commodities, but rather became a
reserve source to supply such commodities should the need
have arisen. It will be remembered from the study of the
Canol system that this project in actuality supplied during
its operation only the equivalent of the carrying capacity
of ten average-size ocean-going tankers. But, should the
need have arisen, the Canol system could have drawn on the
60 to 100 million bbl. estimated reserve of the Norman Wells
area.
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A Contributor to the Advancement of Petroleum
Transportation Technology
.
Lastly, the utilization of the
pipeline in the war contributed greatly to the advancement
of petroleum transportation technology. One need only look
at each of the systems examined for this to become apparent.
It seems largely due to the war that the permanent "large
diameter" pipeline first came into use. The possibility
of constructing these "Dig Inch" lines had been conceived
before the war; but it finally became a reality largely due
to the pressing demands made by the war.
The demand for the rapid transport of petroleum in
the field of military operations offered an incentive for
petroleum transportation research; and this research led
to the development of the flexible portable military pipe-
line which could be laid rather quickly over varying types
of terrain, and offered an immediate supply to the military
theatre
.
Finally, the war and the pipeline offered transporta-
tion engineers new experience in operating under and adapting
to adverse conditions. In the Artie areas the engineers
learned to adapt themselves to the permafrost, muskeg swamps,
"glacial flow," and extreme temperatures. While in the
tropics, they learned to adapt to the dense jungles, the
98
torrential monsoon rains, and the high temperatures; and in
all areas, to rough terrain, rivers, streams, swamps, and
various manmade obstructions.
The pipeline has often been overlooked in its capacity
as a facility for the transport of strategic wartime materials.
Yet this facility has been very important in many ways. It
is therefore hoped that through this study the reader has
developed a concept as to the importance of the pipeline
and the various roles which it played as an integral part
of the wartime transportation scheme.
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APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY WAR EMERGENCY
PIPE LINE PROJECTS*
Project 1
Increased crude movements north and east from Texas by
enlargement of existing systems and reversing of Tuscarora
line. Movements to Illinois increased by 40,000 barrels a
day, of which 27,000 barrels a day reach eastern refineries.
All industry financed at estimated cost of 35,000,000. Work
started in 1942, some parts finished in that year; all parts
completed in early 1943
Part A--Texas into Oklahoma: Capacity of Texas Company
line from Port Arthur to Stuart, Oklahoma, increased, and line
reversed. Capacity of Stanolind line from Graford, Texas, to
Healdton, Oklahoma, increased; connecting line to Hewitt, Okla-
homa, built by Oklahoma Pipe Line Company.
Part B--0klahoma and Kansas to Illinois: Capacity of
Texas-Empire between Cushing 0kla e
,
and Chicago, 111., increased.
Capacity of Stanolind line from Kansas City, Mo., to Chicago,
increased. Capacity of Ajax line from Tulsa to Wood River, 111.,
increased. Several river crossings replaced by Shell and Stano-
lind.
Part C--Illinois to East Coast: Capacity of Buckeye line
between Mantua, Ohio, and Cooks Ferry, Pa., increased. Illinois
Pipeline laid 152-mile 8-inch line parallelling the Lima-East
Sparta, Ohio, line. Tuscarora's line between Negley, Ohio, and
Bayway, New Jersey, reversed and converted to crude oil service.
Capacity of four lines (National Transit, Northern, Tide Water,
and Southern) in Pennsylvania increased,,
Project 2
Plantation Pipe Line Projects to increase product move-
ment to East, Work started in 1942, completed in early 1943.
*"War Emergency Projects Account for Bulk of New Pipe
Line Work," The Oil Weekly , Vol. 112, No. 9, January 31, 1944,
pp. 132-133.
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Part A--Bayou Line: Bayou Pipe Line Company constructed
304 miles 10 and 8-inch between Baytown, Texas, and Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, to feed 60,000 barrels a day of products to Plantation
line. Privately financed at estimated cost of 57,400,000.
Contractors: I. C. Little Company on 10-inch between Port
Neches and Baton Rouge; 0. R. Smith Construction Company on
8-inch between Baytown and Port Neches, and on 6-inch feeders.
Part B--Plantation Capacity Increased between Baton Rouge,
La., and Greensboro, N.C., by installation of 14 new booster
stations. Capacity increased from 60,000 to 90,000 barrels per
day, Privately financed at estimated cost of $4,000,000.
Part C--Construction of 175-mile extension of plantation
line from Greensboro to Richmond, Va. Capacity 28,000 barrels
daily. Government financed at an estimated cost of 54,500,000.
Project 3
Shipping Capacity from Illinois eastward increased: An
82-mile 8-inch line constructed from Tiffing to Doylestown, Ohio.
Capacity 20,000 barrels per day. Government financed at esti-
mated cost of 51,200,000.
A 29-mile extension laid by Standard of Ohio to Randolph,
Ohio, to connect with reversed Sun-Susquehanna line between
Philadelphia and Cleveland, Capacity 15,000 barrels daily.
Standard of Ohio, Shell and Standard of Indiana made
necessary extensions, connections and rearrangements to provide
a through products line from Wood River, Illinois, to the East
Coast.
Work on all projects started in 1942, completed in 1943.
Project 4
To Increase Pipe Line Capacity in East: All industry
financed at estimated cost of 31,700,000. Work started in 1942,
completed in 1943. Consisted of following:
Part A— Increased lake tanker movement into Buffalo for
delivery through gasoline lines into New York State, Buffalo-
Keystone line between Buffalo and Rochester reversed.
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Part B--Keystone-Atlantic gasoline line from Philadelphia
to Pittsburgh reversed and converted to crude service. Capacity
25,000 barrels daily.
Part C--Construction of 110-mile extension ofSinclair's
Philadelphia-Pittsburgh products line to Steubenville, Ohio.
That part of line from Schaef ferstown, Pennsylvania, to Steuben-
ville, Ohio, reversed to eastward service. Capacity 12,000
barrels a day. Branch from Schaefferstown to Baltimore, Md.
,
was extended to Washington, D. C.
Project 5
Helena Line? Construction of 158-mile 10-inch products
line from Ell Dorado to Helena, Arkansas. Capacity 55,000 barrels
a day. Privately financed at estimated cost of 33,700,000.
Contractors: Williams Bros. Corp.
Two lines from Port Arthur, Texas, were reversed (one of
which was converted) and numerous extensions laid to provide
adequate feeder capacity at £1 Dorado. From Helena products
are barged up the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers to the Cincinnati-
Pittsburgh area for transshipment by tank car to East Coast.
All work completed in 1942.
Projects 6 and 10
"Little-Big-Inch" Products Line: War Emergency Pipe Line,
Inc., in 1943 commenced construction of 20-inch products line
from Beaumont, Texas, to East Coast. Work almost completed by
end of year. Government financed at estimated cost of $75,000,000
Consisted of 1640 miles of new construction, including 61-mile
line from Beaumont to Baytown, 60 miles of feeder lines connecting
refineries in Baytown area, 51 miles of lines in Beaumont area,
and delivery lines in the New York Harbor area. Capacity 235,000
barrels a day of gasoline. Contractors: Williams Bros. Corp.;
Sharman & Allen; N. A. Saigh Co. ; Winston-Guthrie & Brown; B. &
|Y). Construction Co.; Oil States Construction Co.; Swinerton &
Walberg; Sheehan Pipe Line Construction Co.; Midwestern Engineer-
ing & Construction Co.; J. C. Truman Construction Co 8 ; Ray L.
Smith Construction Co.; C. S. Foreman Co.; Bechtel-Dempsey Co.;
0. C. Whitaker Co.; I. C. Little Co.; Oklahoma Contracting Co.
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Project 8
"Big-Inch" Crude Oil Line: War Emergency Pipe Line,
Inc., 24-inch crude line from Longview, Texas, to New York-
Philadelphia area. Government financed at estimated cost of
595,000,000. Started in 1942, leg from Longview to Norris
City, 111., put in operation in January, 1943, and leg from
Norris City to Cast put in operation in early August, 1943.
Consists of 1253 miles of 24-inch pipe, 111 miles of 20-inch
pipe, and an extensive feeder system. From Phoenixville,
Pa., 20-inch extensions to both Philadelphia and Linden, New
Jersey, from which points refineries are served by short
delivery lines. Capacity of system 300,000 barrels a day.
Contractors? Williams Bros. Corp. j Dempsey Construction Co.;
Oklahoma Contracting Co.; Anderson Brothers; C. S. Foreman;
Sheehan Pipe Line Construction Co.; Ray L. Smith; Betchel &
Dempsey; 0. C. Whitaker; I. C. Little; Midwestern Engineering
& Construction Co.; Exeter Construction Co.; Ford, Bacon &
Davis.
To feed the "Big-Inch", War Emergency Pipelines built
50 miles of short links to handle different grades of crude,
and four companies (Sun-Stanolind, Pan American, Shell and
Atlantic) reversed their lines from East Texas field to Gulf
Coast. Several other projects in Texas either feed 24-inch
line or replace crude going into it.
Project 12
Trans-Florida Lines A 200-mile 8-inch line built from
Carrabelle to Jacksonville, Florida. Government financed at
an estimated cost of $4,200,000. Capacity 26,000 barrels a
day 8 Line fed by barge on Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. Work
started in 1942, completed in 1943. Contractors: Anderson
Bros, laid line; Anderson Bros, and Fredell Construction Co„
salvaged and reconditioned pipe from old system in Texas
Project 13
Sinclair's Corpus Christi to Houston Lines 150-mile
8-inch new line from Corpus Christi to Damon Mound, Texas, to
supply Southwest Texas crude to Houston refinery area to replace
crude diverted from East Texas to "Big-Inch." Privately financed
at estimated cost of 33,000,000. Capacity 25,000 barrels daily.
Work started 1942, completed 1943, Contractors 0, C, Whitaker,
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Project 14
Texas Pipe Line Company's 266-mile 8-inch and 10-inch
new line from Paradis, Louisiana, to Port Arthur, Texas, to
bring special Louisiana crudes to Texas' refinery for manu-
facture of butadiene and 100-octane gasoline. Privately
financed at estimated cost of 55,500,000. Capacity 45,000
barrels a day. Work started in 1942, completed 1943. Contractors:
Sharman & Allen; N. A. Saigh Company.
Project 15
Products Line from Cushing to Barnsdall, Okla. , and
Increased Capacity for Great Lakes Pipe Line: 65 miles of new
feeder lines from Cushing-Drumright area to Barnsdall to connect
with Great Lakes Pipe Line extending to Minneapolis and Chicago.
Priv/ately financed at estimated cost of 31,000,000. Capacity
10,000 barrels a day. Line subsequently purchased by Great
Lakes company, which handles this additional gasoline through
installation of 8 new booster stations between Kansas City,
Kansas, and (Ylinneapolis, Completed in 1942.
Project 16
Southwest Emergency Pipe Line: Purchase, reconditioning
and conversion to crude serve of 150 miles of 14-inch and 16-
inch natural gas line from Refugio to Pierce Junction, Texas.
Construction of 26-mile 12-inch extension from Pierce Junction
to Deer Park, 8 miles of line to connect with Shell's refinery
at Houston, terminal facilities at Houston, and 3 miles of
12-inch line at Refugio. Government financed at an estimated
cost of $7,225,000. Capacity 75,000,000 barrels a day.
Contractors: 0. C. Whitakerj Williams Bros.
five lines from Refugio to Corpus Christi, Ingleside
and Harbor Island reversed or extended to feed Southwest and
West Texas crude to Refugio. West Texas crude brought to
Ingleside and Harbor Island from Kemper, Texas, through Humble
Pipe Line. Crude transported from Houston through reversed
Pan American and Shell lines to 24-inch "Big-Inch" line. All
work completed in 1943.
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Project 17
Sinclair's Houston to Huffman Line: A 29-mile 12-inch
new line built from Houston to Huffman, Privately financed at
estimated cost of $900,000. Capacity 50,000 barrels a day.
Sinclair's line from Huffman to Smiths Bluff, Texas, where it
connects with Atlantic's reversed line from Atreco to Longview,
reversed. Completed in 1943. Contractor: 0. C. Whitaker.
Project 18
Crude Line from Southeastern Louisiana to Baton Rouge:
Standard of Louisiana constructed 109 miles of 6-inch, 8-inch
and 10-inch main line and 24 miles of feeder lines from Golden
Meadows field and other South Louisiana fields to Baton Rouge
refinery. Privately financed at estimated cost of $1,500,000.
Capacity 15,000 barrels a day. Completed 1943. Contractors
Sharman & Allen.
Project 19
Enlargement of Stanolind's Crude Line Between Mexia,
Texas, and Humboldt, Kansas: Installation of additional pump-
ing equipment and 139 miles of 8-inch and 10-inch loops.
Privately financed at estimated cost of B1 , 600, 000. Capacity
of system increased by 20,000 barrels a day. Completed in 1943.
Contractors : I. C. Littles Jones & Brooks.
Project 20
Products Line from East Chicago, Indiana, to Toledo, Ohios
Sinclair has under construction a 250-mile 8-inch 30,000 barrel
per day products line. Privately financed at estimated cost
of 36,000,000. Line will eliminate tanker movement via Lake
Michigan and other waterways to Toledo.
Project 21
Stanolind's West Texas to Drumright, Oklahoma, Lines
Construction under way on 385-mile 16-inch crude line from
Slaughter field, Ulest Texas, to Drumright, Oklahoma, to connect
with existing lines extending north to Chicago and St. Louis
refinery areas. Privately financed at estimated cost of
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57,600,000. Capacity 65,000 barrels a day. Seven additional
pump stations can be installed to boost capacity to 116,000
barrels a day. Contractors: I. C. Little; Sharman & Allen;
Midwestern Engineers; 0. C. Whitaker Co.
Project 22
Magnolia's West Texas to Corsicana, Texas, Line:
Construction under way on 333-mile 12-inch line from Midland,
Texas, to Corsicana, and on two 8-inch loops between Seminole
and Midland which aggregate 46 miles. Privately financed at
estimated cost of 36,000,000. Capacity 42,000 barrels a day.
With installation of three additional stations capacity can be
increased to 60,000 barrels a day. Contractors: Jones &
Brooks; Williams Bros.; Oklahoma Contracting Co.
Project 23
Yale Pipe Line System in Wyoming and Montana: Construction
of 37-^ miles of 6-inch and 45 miles of 8-inch crude oil pipe
lines connecting the Elk Basin and Frannie Fields with refineries
at Laurel and Billings, Montana. Privately financed at estimated
cost of 3830,000. Capacity 15,000 barrels a day. Project not
yet started, but approval given.
Project 24
Stanolind Line from Elk Basin to Casper, Wyoming: Plan
70-mile 8-inch crude pipe line from Elk Basin to Little Buffalo
Basin field and 160 miles of 10-inch line from Little Buffalo
to Casper, with one 15,000 barrel per day pump station at Elk
Basin and one 22,000 barrel per day pump station at Little
Buffalo Basin, Privately financed at estimated cost of
34,000,000, Capacity can be increased to 44,000 barrels per
day with additional pumping facilities. Construction not yet
started.
the role: of pipelines in
WORLD WAR TWO
by
Charles Wendell Robertson
A.B., Western Kentucky State College, 1963
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
WASTER OF ARTS
Department of Geology and Geography
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1965
115
During the course of war, various types of transportation
are needed to facilitate the movement of man and materials. One
type that is often overlooked is the pipeline. Since it appeared
that the pipeline did play a significant part in World War Two,
and due to the fact that no general study has been made of the
pipeline as a wartime transport facility, it was thought that a
study leading to the discovery and evaluation of the pipeline's
role in the war might be beneficial. Therefore, through the
collection, organization, and interpretation of transportation
theory, statistical data, maps, and other information concerning
transport in general, and pipelines in particular, such a study
and evaluation was attempted.
The following organization was employed in the study.
First, an examination was made of the role of transportation
in war and of some of the problems encountered in organizing
an optimum wartime transportation system. Secondly, a descriptive
study was undertaken of some of the more important pipeline
systems that were utilized in the war. The study was concluded
by an evaluation of the overall importance of the role that the
pipeline actually played in light of its character and utiliza-
tion.
After careful analyzation of the material, it has been
concluded that the pipeline played not one but a multiplicity
of roles. A summary of these roles are listed immediately
balows
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1
.
Tilled a "supply-gap" in some areas where there
was a displacement of normal commodity-flow.
2. Reduced the "effective distance" of commodity flow.
3. Implemented the redistribution of commodity flow.
4. Acted as a support facility for other modes of
transportation.
5. Supplied a reserve potential.
6. Contributed to the advancement in design, construction,
and technology of petroleum transportation equipment.



